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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This chapter presents the motivation, goals and scope of
this work, and an overview of the development and current use
of games.
1.1 MOTIVATION OF WORK
The use of computer simulations to analyze large complex
systems is now a well-established technique. By combining
detailed numerical models of each component of the system, the
behavior of the entire system can be simulated, observed, and
analyzed; some examples of systems that have been successfully
designed and analyzed by means of computer simulations are
communications networks, the Microwave Landing Systems (MLS)
that competed for the ICAO standard, and many aircraft and
spacecraft, such as Apollo and the Space Transportation System
("Space Shuttle").
Attempts to simulate systems that involve human decision-
making (pricipally economic and economy-related systems) have
not been so successful. The difficulty in modeling an indi-
vidual's decision-making process: leads to the impossibility
of fully modeling such systems, short of including a human
element in the simulation itself. This is precisely the
essence of the gaming approach to system simulation a number
of "players" (properly called "game participants") drive, with
their decisions, numerical models of the other components of
the system under consideration.
This effort is motivated by the author's belief that
research on domestic air transportation may benefit from the
use of such a game for the following reasons:
a) There is a significant number of mathematical
models developed or in development about elements
of its operations, which have not been inte-
grated.
b) The industry is reaching a turning point, namely
deregulation, which increases the relative impor-
tance of the human decision-making element over a
wider range of options.
* Traditional microeconomic demand-supply equilibrium models,
such as the Cournot solution, do not model the producer
decision-making process; they simply postulate a certain
behavior, and model the mathematical consequences of that
behavior.
The effort undertaken in past years to develop and refine
mathematical models for the airline industry, was made possi-
ble in part by the wealth of numerical data available. In
their unique position between private industry and the public
utilities, the airlines have been forced to keep and make pub-
lic a staggering amount of data. The high technology environ-
ment that permeates the industry has enhanced both the quan-
tity and quality of this data gathering effort, and the uses
of this data for model-building (and analytical) purposes.
These models are highly interrelated, but in general are
used individually by making simple assumptions about other
elements of the system. Thus, sophisticated demand models
assume simple statistical supply functions, supply models
assume non-competitive environments, etc. A computer simula-
tion, such as the one required for this game, seems to be the
ideal way of integrating many of these models in a coherent
fashion, while the gaming dimension acts as a surrogate for
the unmodelable human decision-making component.
One of the consequences of the current trend towards der-
egulation in the air transportation industry is an increase in
the freedom and range of management decisions. This in turn
increases the relative importance of the human decision-making
element in the total environmental uncertainty in which the
industry must operate. The difficulty in modeling the indi-
vidual decision-making process indicates a gaming approach to
systems analysis.
1.2 GOAL AND SCOPE OF THIS WORK
With the above motivation in mind, we define the goal of
the present effort as follows:
To design, build, and test a computer game for
U.S. domestic passenger air carriers, based prima-
rily on existing mathematical models of its opera-
tions and economics. This game must offer a suffi-
cient degree of quantitative accuracy to analyze
effects of managerial and regulatory decisions on an
air transportation system. As a secondary goal, the
game should also be usable as a training device in
the teaching of subjects on air transoortation.
We also impose the following limitations:
W i NMIOMM
1.- New models are not built, unless found
absolutely indispensable for the simulation's
accuracy or completeness. In this context, and
in the rest of this work, the word "model" shall
be used to denote mathematical models of the var-
ious functions that make up the game's environ-
ment simulation (e.g. the demand model, the cost
of money model).
2.- Similarly, the numerical data (parameters) that
the models may require, are not developed. Maxi-
mum use is made of existing data, and deficien-
cies in the data available are pointed out but
not corrected.
3.- Only test and demonstration cases are run. The
application of the game to the analysis of real-
world problems or situations is left as future
work to be done.
1.3 APPROACH USED
A computerized game is actually made up of two compo-
nents:
a) A set of rules and data that define the "game
scenario".
b) The computer model of the system under considera-
tion.
The purpose of the game scenario is threefold:
a) To define and limit the decision-making freedom
of the participants (e.g. degree of price compe-
tition, route structures, etc.)
b) To define the environmental assumptions under
which a particular game is run (e.g. types of
aircraft, market demand parameters, etc.)
c) To model aspects of the environment for which
there are no convenient mathematical models suit-
able for computer coding (e.g. when and to whom
government subsidies are paid).
Throughout the work, the term "environment" or "game
environment" will be used to denote the collection of data and
processes external to the system but which affect the behavior
of the system. In our case, the "system" is made up of a num-
ber of airlines, and the environment is made out of elements
such as the latitudes and longitudes of airports (physical
environment), the speed and fuel consumption of aircraft
(technical environment) or the route freedom of the partici-
pants (regulatory environment).
The allocation of system and environment models to either
the computer simulation or the game scenario is one of the
important design decisions to be made. The computer simula-
tion offers greater data-processing capability at the expense
of flexibility (every possible case must be pre-programmed).
The scenario rules offer greater flexibility, but must not
require tedious calculations. In addition, only well-defina-
ble models can be mechanized as computer code, whereas the
scenario rules may use subjective judgement ("umpiring").
This work has proceeded in the following fashion:
a) The functional structure of the game was defined.
b) The level of detail at which the game was to be
implemented was determined.
c) Based on this level of detail, a selection of
which components of airline operations to be
included was made. These components were then
allocated either to the computer simulation or to
the scenario rules.
d) The mathematical models for the components of the
computer simulation were defined.
e) The models were implemented (coded), along with
the additional software required to mechanize the
game.
f) The integrated game was tested with simple cases
to test the validity of the code.
The next Section reviews the history and development of
games, in particular computer games. For readers not familiar
with the peculiarities of the airline industry, Appendix A
describes briefly the principal aspects of air transportation
economics that influence this work. Chapter II describes the
game design process, the tradeoffs involved, and the design
decisions made (steps a and b, above). Chapter III explains
in detail the mathematical models used in the computer simula-
tion. Chapter IV includes a description of the software
implementation of the game, a detailed, annotated example
illustrating the functioning of the mathematical models used,
and a sample of actual use of the game for teaching and analy-
sis purposes. Chapter V discusses a number of extensions and
improvements that have been identified during the game's
development, as well as some suggestions for possible applica-
tions of the game. Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions and
recommendations for future work. Appendices B and C contain a
detailed development of the demand vs. time-of-day function
and the load factor tail-off function respectively. Appendix
D contains a full description of the data bases used, along
with the conversational commands available to interactively
access, modify or update these data bases.
1.4 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SIMULATION GAMES
Games, that is, physical or mental competitions between
two or more participants carried out according to a set of
rules, are probably as old as mankind; a bas-relief in the
palace of Ramses II (1292-1225 B.C.) in Thebes shows the King
playing a board game with pieces that bear an astonishing res-
semblance with those of modern chess. Most intellectual games
(as opposed to most physical games, or "sports") mimic more or
less accurately a real-world situation; when they do, they are
called "simulation" games.
Traditionally, simulation games have been directed
towards the warfare-making activity of mankind; they ranged
from table-top board games in which tokens idealize, both in
shape and in function, various elements of an army to, at the
other extreme, full-sized maneuvers in the field complete with
mock battles. From the very beginning a tradeoff between cost
and realism becomes evident: the more realistic the simula-
tion, the more expensive it is to run ("play") the game.
The original purpose of these games seems invariably to
have been that of providing the participants with vicarious
experience in the decision-making process of the simulated
situation. With the passing of time, the low-cost end of the
spectrum evolved into less realistic (and less useful) but
more enjoyable forms designed for pleasure, not training.
Simultaneously, the high-fidelity end evolved into various
forms of military gymnastics (the medieval jousts and tourna-
ments, and the XVIIIth century army drills) with little or no
decision-making contents.
It is only in the XVIIIth century, particularly in the
central european army staffs and staff schools, that the value
of games as decision-making training devices is formally rec-
ognized. Prussia's Baron von Peisswitz, and his son Johann,
are generally credited by military historians with the devel-
opment of the first modern war qame, or Kriegspiel, around
1811. This game, played on maps or sand-table models of a
battleground, was made up of rules determining the outcome of
engagements between different types of military units (fusili-
ers, cavalry, etc.). Its purpose was twofold: to provide
officers with simulated field command experience, and to expe-
riment with unconventional combat tactics. For the first
time, the game environment is analyzed rationally for the pur-
pose of developing detailed and realistic models, including
effect of terrain and weather, casualties inflicted, etc.
Again, the realism-cost tradeoff is in evidence: umpires were
usually needed to evaluate the results, both in order to
reduce the burden on the participants and because some of the
models used involved some form of subjective judgement.
Up to this stage in the historical development of gaming,
simulation of the real environment is performed by a set of
manually-evaluated rules or "models" describing the effects of
the participants' actions on the simulated environment. The
process of evaluating these rules is traditionally called
"scoring". The advent of digital computers radically reduced
the cost of scoring to an extent such that the degree of
fidelity of the environment simulation is now the availabil-
ity, applicability, and accuracy of the models themselves.
The tradeoff between realism and the cost of gaming to the
player still exists, because high model fidelity usually
requires a larger number of decisions and more input data from
the game players than lower-fidelity games.
The emergence, towards the end of World War II, of the
mathematical discipline called "Operations Research" gave
impetus to the search of rational, analytical, decision making
processes. It was soon found, however, that only a limited
number of decision-making situations were solvable by pure
analytical techniques. Ellis A. Johnson, head of the Naval
Ordnance Laboratory (NOL) Operations Research group approached
the problem of selecting mining patterns by playing games
between minelaying and minesweeping teams. The mining strate-
gies thus developed actually improved the effectiveness of
mining operations agains Japan.
In early 1950, George Gamow, at John Hopkins University
Operations Research Office (ORO) developed "TIN SOLDIER",
which is recognized as the first game designed specifically as
a mathematical model for use in analytical research (Reference
1). The use of stochastic processes in that game lead to the
introduction of a computer for scoring via Monte-Carlo techni-
ques (an IBM 650 was expressely installed at ORO to run the
game), and by 1952, ORO had the first full-scale computer-
scored game. By 1962, it was estimated that 57 organizations
in the U.S., 2 in England, and one in Canada, used games for
one purpose or another. Of these, 5 were primarily oriented
towards training, 16 towards the evaluation of military opera-
tions at different levels, and 47 devoted to research and
development.
In 1956, an American Management Association (AMA) team,
with the cooperation of IBM, was set up to develop a manage-
ment game following closely the military models. A well-pub-
licized demonstration was set up at the New York headquarters
of the Association, with twenty corporation presidents partic-
ipating in it. Reactions to it ranged from outright enthusi-
asm to severe skepticism (Reference 2). After this initial
attempt, business interest in games dwindled, partly as a con-
sequence of the reaction to the cultural disruption caused by
the introduction of computers in general, partly because of
the lack of the required analytical and mathematical modeling
expertise in the industries themselves.
The academic community, however, soon grasped the poten-
tial that such games could have as training tools. In addi-
tion, they had the expertise in modeling the various compo-
nents of the business environment that computer experts
lacked. The result was a veritable boom of "Management Games"
designed as low-cost, high-realism class exercises for manage-
ment students. From the first UCLA game, with only 8 decision
variables, we now find games with more than 300 possible deci-
sion inputs, and practically every management school in the
country has at least one game implemented in its computer sys-
tem (Reference 3).
Some authors define "operational games" as those games
where the environment modeling is accurate and realistic
enough to allow evaluation of operational decisions, whereas
the term "management games" is reserved to games designed with
educational objectives in mind. Using this terminology, most
military games are operational games. Academic, or management
games proper, are usually classified as general purpose games
("general games"), and specific games.
General games are games whose input (decision) variables
cover a wide range of managerial disciplines (production,
,Ow-
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finances, marketing, etc). The main purpose of these games is
to show to the student the interrelationships between these
various aspects of management (Reference 4).
On the other hand, games can be "specific" in one of two
ways, which are sometimes found simultaneously:
- Discipline-specific: one aspect of the management
skills spectrum is emphasized (marketing,
finance), while the others are eliminated or de-
emphasized. Such games are usually designed for
use in advanced courses in that subject (Refer-
ence 5).
- Industry-specific: the idiosyncrasies of a par-
ticular industry (e.g. the Oil industry) are
emphasized (Reference 6).
As it turns out, most industry-specific games are also
discipline-specific.
In the field of air transportation, there are three gam-
ing efforts known to the author. The first, by Air Canada
(Reference 3) models a two-airline, four-market scenario. The
decision variables (inputs) include the number of flights (but
not their schedule), the aircraft's seating arrangement split
(first class/economy class), financial (two alternatives),
maintenance procedures, and passenger service, advertising and
market research expenditures. The game is designed for train-
ing airline personnel, and specifically to show the interrela-
tionships among the various departments of the airline.
The second, at the University of Tennessee College of
Business Administration, is non-interactive (a participant's
actions do not affect the othr participant's results), and
contains some probabilistic elements. As listed in the avail-
able literature, this game's decision variables include
routes, aircraft type and configuration, arrival times (sic),
advertising policy for each city, and market information to be
purchased. The training ourpose is to "improve the decision-
making process, reactions, goal selection, and implementation"
(Reference 3).
The third, by H. B. Tyber at McDonnell Douglas (Reference
8) simulates a multi-carrier (up to five participants) airline
system at the senior management level. Decision variables
are: total number of flights in each one of four regions (e.g.
"the North Atlantic"), crew wage levels, short-term borrowing
level, and the inevitable advertising and market research
expenditures. Certain number of "frills" (e.g. the relative
effect of on-board movies vs. that of free drinks) are added
in for realism. This game was designed for use in a corporate
Market Development Course to "provide airline employees with a
review of all the aspects of airline planning on a systems-
wide basis".
All three games described are typical business-school
marketing-oriented games mechanized in the framework of the
air transportation industry. These games, and in particular
the level of detail and quantitative accuracy of their envi-
ronment models, were designed solely for training purposes,
and are not suitable for analysis, research, or "operational"
uses.
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CHAPTER II
GAME DESIGN
This chapter analyzes the overall game design, the allo-
cation of elements of the game to either the computer simula-
tion or the scenario rules, and the different levels of detail
at which the environment can be simulated. The decisions
made, and the rationale behind these decisions are described.
2.1 OVERALL GAME STRUCTURE
In the most general terms, a game functions in the manner
shown schematically in Figure 1. There are N participants
("players"), each representing a competing operational unit
(in our case, air carriers). Each participant produces a set
of "decision variables". These variables, plus whatever scen-
ario data is applicable, constitute the input to a simulation
of a real-world situation, in our case, the operations of
domestic air carriers. The output of the simulation is data
which can be grouped according to its purpose:
Common data
p
System data
Figure l.- Generalized game structure
U
a) Data of interest to the game user for the purpose
for which the game is performed. We call this
"System Analysis" data.
b) Data which is made available to all participants
("Common" data).
c) Data which is made available to each participant
on an individual basis ("Private" data).
The game is carried out as a sequence of plays, or "iter-
ations". Each iteration corresponds to the simulation of a
certain amount of real time, such as a month, a quarter, or a
year. Thus, the participant's decisions are fixed during that
simulated time, and the simulated results represent the aver-
age results over that same period of time. Participants are
allowed to change their inputs (and examine the data made
available to them) between iterations. Data available to the
participants include the above-mentioned "Common" and "Pri-
vate" data, scenario data, and, if allowed by the scenario
rules, communications between participants.
The scenario, which includes both rules and all the mod-
els and data not internal to the computer simulation, may be
static or change from iteration to iteration ("dynamic scen-
ario"). In particular, the scenario changes may be keyed to
the results of the simulation via some feedback data. If human
decision-making is part of this feedback, then we have in
effect an (N+l)th player (the "exogenous participant"), or an
umpire.
Of particular interest is the start-up (first iteration)
problem, since the only data available to the participants is
the scenario data. There are several ways in which the game
may be initiated. Two possibilities are:
a) The scenario may depict a real-world startup sit-
uation (e.g. the creation of a new carrier oper-
ating in a new market).
b) The scenario data may include simulated past-op-
erations Common and Private data.
Figure 2 shows, in schematic form, a model for an air
carrier, in terms of the flow of orocesses and data that link
operational results to the management decisions. The central
process in this flow is the determination of total demand and
the allocation of this demand among competing carriers (and
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Figure 2.- Air carrier operations functional flow model.
among a carrier's different flights). Total demand and its
allocation are influenced by management's decision of the
level of service offered by the flight schedule the price of
this service. The level of service (schedule) also determines
the resources (aircraft, ground facilities, flight crews,
etc.) required to provide these services.
The resources required then determine the cash flow
required (investment). These financial requirements have a
certain cost associated with them; costs are also associated
with the maintenance and use of the resources, as well as
other operational requirements of providing the level of serv-
ice determined by the management. Costs combine then with the
revenues (intenal and external) to yeld the carrier's net
income. This net income (positive or negative) in turn
affects the financial cash flow.
2.2 DESIGN DECISIONS AND TRADEOFFS
The three games described in Section 1.1 do not meet the
level of detail and numerical accuracy required of an opera-
tional game for two reasons: first, they do not attempt to
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model in detail the actual operations of airlines; second, the
range of operating conditions that they are capable of simu-
lating is limited to the "usual" conditions that have pre-
vailed in the industry during the past two decades.
Previous efforts at modeling in detail the operation of
airlines (mostly directed towards operational analysis, not
gaming) also have made use of this historical limited opera-
tional freedom. For example, the McDonnell-Douglas ASPEM
(Airline Schedule Planning and Evaluation Model, References 9
and 10) and the Boeing SSFX (Reference 11) assume a fixed
demand and a fixed market share (oer market) irregardless of
the simulated carrier's operations. This assumption may have
been acceptable during the CAB-regulated market years, but is
certainly not valid in a deregulated competitive scenario.
The same observation applies to the traditional "Market
Share=Frequency Share" model. In view of the limitations of
these previous efforts, design of the game has to be started
from scratch.
In order to design the structure of the game and its sim-
ulation, three basic decisions must be made:
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a) The level of of detail (or aggregation) at which
operations will be simulated
b) Which elements of operations to include in the
game, and which to ignore or simplify.
c) Which elements to mechanize as computer code and
which to be considered part of the scenario
rules.
These decisions interrelate, e.g. whether to include a
model for certain operational element depends on whether the
level of aggregation used makes that element irrelevant,
optional, or necessary for the rest of the simulation.
These decisions were also affected by limits on the
resources available to the author for implementing of the
game. Elements or models excluded or simplified for cost rea-
sons are identified as such, and suggestions for their incor-
poration or improvement given the necessary resources, are
included as recommendations for future work.
2.3 ALTERNATIVE LEVELS OF AGGREGATION
We can identify three broad levels of aggregation at
which the game and its environment simulation can be imple-
mented. These levels of aggregation are examined as they
affect the modeling of demand, supply, market share alloca-
tion, and costs. We also identify the costs and benefits of
each level of aggregation on these components.
2.3.1 System-wide aggregation
At this, the topmost level of aggregation, supply and
demand are determined as aggregates over an entire market
area, such as "the North Atlantic" or "the transcontinental
markets". Supply is determined by the number of flights
offered in that market, while demand is a function of the
total supply, and perhaps an average fare level. Market share
is determined from the flight share (a proxy for frequency
share, since the average number of flight hours per flight is
the same for all the carriers in the area), with perhaps some
provision for differential area-wide fare levels.
The operating costs, at this level of aggregation, are
usually assumed to be proportional to the number of flights,
based on average costs, with perhaps some provision for econo-
mies (or diseconomies) of scale. With this crude structure,
the efficiency of each carrier in the use of resources cannot
be determined from the participant's decision variables, and
must be set externally (e.g. the same for all participants).
In other words, costs are determined solely by the aggregate
level of service offered.
The advantage of this level of aggregation is the sim-
plicity of the participant's decision variables required to
model the carrier's management. Indeed, at this level, it
would be feasible to construct a mathematical model for these
decisions, thus eliminating the human element and converting
the game into a numerically-solved, closed form analysis
model.
System-wide aggregation has been used, and is very appro-
priate to management training games, where fidelity in model-
ing the operational aspects of the industry is secondary to
the goal of offering the participants a subjective "feel" for
what it is like to be the Chief Executive Officer of an air-
line. An example of this level of modeling is the McDonnell
Douglas (Peference 8) game already mentioned.
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2.3.2 Market-level disaggregation
At this level, each individual market (i.e. origin-desti-
nation demand area pairs) is modeled. This requires the mod-
eling of individual flight itineraries if any network effects
are to be observable. In addition, the user may assign indi-
vidual aircraft types to individual routes. This in turn
allows estimation of flight-dependent direct operating costs.
Since the timetable of departures is not modeled, there is no
way of determining either the exact number of aircraft
required to fly the entire network, or the relative desirabil-
ity of otherwise identical flights. Rough approximations to
the number of aircraft needed can be obtained by dividing the
total number of flight-hours implied by the itineraries by an
average utilization. Since different aircraft types can be
assigned to each itinerary, the fleet requirements and owner-
ship costs can be evaluated by aircraft type.
Now it is possible to model both regulatory restrictions
on routes, and the effect of differential fares. The number
of decision variables that the user must now input is signifi-
cant (flight itineraries, aircraft used on each itinerary,
fares). Acquisition, sale, and lease of individual aircraft
types can be modeled at this level, but with limited useful-
ness, since the exact number required cannot be determined.
The Air Canada and University of Tennessee games men-
tioned in the previous chapter are examples of this level of
detail.
2.3.3 Schedule-level disaggregation
At this level, the schedule (time of day) of departure
for each flight is also specified. This allows aircraft flow
to be modeled, and hence the exact size of the fleet required
can be determined. This in turns allows the use of a detailed
model of aircraft acquisitions and transactions, including
depreciation costs, tax rebates, etc. On the demand side, the
time-of-day variation of demand (and flight preference) must
be modeled. The added demand generated by connecting services
can be included.
Direct and indirect operating costs are modeled in the
same way as in the previous level; maintenance and crew costs
must be averaged over the flight-hour.
The cost of this additional level of detail is, of
course, the need for a full-fledged scheduling job on the part
of the participant, at least until an acceptable computer
model of the scheduling function of an airline can be
designed.
These three levels of aggregation, also referred to as
"Level I", "Level II", and "Level III", and their effect on
some of the components of the system are summarized in Figure
3.
The highest level of aggregation, systemwide, was not
deemed acceptable for the type of gaming that was sought.
Although usable for training purposes, it does not model real-
ity with any degree of precision required to perform any use-
ful experimentation.
The next level, dissagregation by market, is detailed
enough to perform some experimentation, e.g. differential
fares, deregulation of routes, elimination of cross-subsidiza-
tion, etc. It was originally thought to be the ideal level to
start this simulation project, since it has a very simple user
interface (flight itineraries and equipment only). However,
it lacks the capability of accounting for the financial
aspects of aircraft transactions.
Operations Regional total Individual Individual
# of flights flig.ht flight
itineraries schedules
Demand Global, over By individual By region pair
entire area region pairs time of day.
Market share Flight hours Frequency Relative
share share, by desirability
market of each flight
Direct Op. Estimated from Computed for each individual
costs. total flight flight segment - crew and
hours maintenance averaged by type
Indirect Op. Estimated from Estimated from seat-miles,
costs. total flight passenger-miles, number of
hours enplanements, fleet size
Fleet required Estimated from Estimated from Computed
total flight flight hours, exactly
hours by type
Equipment Estimated for Exact by a/c
transactions Not applicable each aircraft type, time in
(1) type service
Financial Cash flow Annualized
transactions Not applicable requirements accounting
(1) only
(1) Cannot model the cash flow with sufficient accuracy.
Figure 3.- Possible levels of model aggregation
and their effect on several system components.
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Component Level I Level II Level III
Financial planning was the reason why the third level,
disaggregation by schedules, was selected. Coupled with rea-
sonable scenarios for cost of money and equipment, it allows
experiments of a reasonably long time frame (several years),
that is, strategic planning, to be carried out.
2.4 SELECTION AND LIMITATION OF COMPONENTS
Real-world air carrier operations have a large amount of
variability: airlines carry oassengers (in two, now sometimes
three service classes), mail, cargo, charging wildly disparate
fares, and sometimes generating revenue from non-flying opera-
tions, such as leasing out their equipment, or embarking in
"peripheral" business, such as training other carrier's flight
crews, providing catering services, or running hotel chains.
It is impractical to include in the game every possible
operating and revenue-generating activity, cost element, etc.
In addition, the structure and level of detail of the game
inherently limit the level of detail of the game's components
(e.g. the structure of the cost model). In this section, we
discuss five elements of the game, namely demand, supply, the
asset and financial management function, and the cost and rev-
enue structures. The real-world components of each of these
elements, its variability, and the limitations and simplifica-
tions that will be used in this game are discussed.
2.4.1 Comoonents of Demand
There are several kinds of "goods" that may require air
transportation: passengers, freight, mail. Under certain cir-
cumstances these demands do not compete for the available sup-
ply (e.g. belly cargo on a passenger flight). In most cases,
however, there is a certain degree of interaction (e.g. pay-
load tradeoff between cargo and passengers on a convertible
aircraft, or network scheduling conflicts between freight and
passenger service). More evident is the competition for serv-
ices of different "grades" of the same type of demand, such as
business passengers and pleasure passengers, which share the
same supply of seats.
The simulation of multiple, simultaneous, interactive
demands requires separate modeling (each with its own parame-
ters) of each demand. In addition, separate supply parameters
must be determined for each demand (e.g. fares, the number of
first-class seats vs. number of coach seats or passenger-cargo
tradeoffs for each aircraft, etc). This results in a large
effort being required both to play the game and to prepare it
(the number of market demand parameters and of decision varia-
bles is multiplied by the number of different demands that are
simulated).
Admittedly, there are problems that can only be analyzed
using multiple demand. However, within the scope of this
effort, we can obtain useful results from the simulation of a
single class of demand, such as a single class of passengers
or a single class of freight. Section 5.1 discusses how the
game can be extended to the case of multiple interacting
demands.
Even for a single class of demand, we still must deter-
mine what endogenous and/or external variables will affect
this demand. In the real world, total demand changes with
time: time of day, day of the week, season of the year. Since
we are going to restrict flights to daily frequency, there is
no benefit from modeling the day of the week dependence of
demand. On the other hand, we will be modeling flight depar-
ture and arrival times, so that the time-of-day variation of
demand must be modeled. Seasonal variations affect the
results if the period simulated per game iteration (iteration
period) is of the order of the seasonal variation (around
three months). Seasonal variation of demand can thus be mod-
eled by simply changing market demand parameters from one game
iteration to the next.
Since one of the objectives of this game is to allow sim-
ulation of de-regulated, competitive scenarios, we must
include the effect of price on total demand, as well as the
effects of competitive services and prices on the allocation
of total demand.
2.4.2 Components of Supply
At the level of detail selected, each game participant
must specify each flight in his network. The word "flight" is
sometimes used to denote two different concepts:
a) The movement of an aircraft through a series of
airports ("flight itinerary") carrying fly-
through passenqers (e.g. "Flight 365" is a flight
from 30 to NYC to DCA).
b) The air transportation service offered between
two cities (e.g. "Flight 365 between BOS and
NYC", "Flight 365 between BOS and DCA" and
"Flight 365 between NYC and DCA" for the same
BOS-NYC-DCA flight).
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In this work we will reserve the word "flight" to signify
the first meaning, i.e. "Flight 365". We will use the terms
"service" or "service offering" to signify meaning b) above.
Thus an N-segment flight (in our meaning) will produce
(N+1)N/2 service offerings. Conversely, a service offering
may require more than one flight (a connection). Service
offerings (not "flights") may be non-stop, n-stop, or connect-
ing. Thus, the Official Airline Guide (OAG) is properly a
listing of service offerings, rather than of flights.
Flight itineraries and schedules change, in the real
world, in two different periods:
a) The regular, published, day to day variations,
such as a flight not offered on Sundays, or a
weekly itinerary alteration.
b) The monthly (or discrete) readjustment of the
schedule for marketing reasons (e.g. seasonal-
ity), which is reflected in a new edition of the
OAG.
In order to model weekly schedules, each day of the week
must be simulated and processed separately for each game iter-
ation. The simple expedient of multiplying each flight's
demand by its relative frequency (e.g. 2/7 for a twice-weekly
flight) does not produce valid results at the level of detail
that we are using. To illustrate this, consider a market with
one daily flight and two twice-a-week fliqhts. All other
flight parameters being eaual, the simple frequency weighting
mentioned above would distribute 63.6% (7/11) of the demand to
the daily flight, and 18.2% (2/11) to each of the twice-weekly
flights. In reality, this proportion depends on whether the
days of the twice-weekly flights coincide or not.
If indeed they do, we have two days of the week with
three flights, and five days with a flight each. We would
thus expect that the daily flight would get 5/7 of the demand
for the five days in which it is the only flight, plus 2/21
for the two days during which it has to share the demand with
two other flights, for a total of 80.9% of the market. The
two twice-weekly flights would get only 2/21 (9.5%) of the
market each.
Thus, in order to simulate the effects of weekly varia-
tion of supply, we must simulate each day of the week sepa-
rately (maybe with varying demand, as mentioned in the previ-
ous Subsection), including input data with each flight to
allow determination of the exact schedule for each day of the
week. We have decided that the complexity of input data and
increase in computation time is not cost effective for domes-
*
tic airlines*.
The second, monthly or seasonal variability, is taken
care of, and is limited in freguency by, the simulated length
of each game play or iteration. This length is left variable,
and is determined by the parameter NDP (Number of Days per
Period). Thus, depending on the objectives of the particular
game run, weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly variations can
be introduced. We have elected to ignore non-scheduled opera-
tions (e.g. individual charters). The extension of an itera-
tive game such as this to include non-repetitive events such
as a charter flight is a major challenge.
The process of converting flight itineraries and sched-
ules into a list of service offerings such as the OAG requires
two steps:
a) Conversion of multiple-segment flights into a
list of individual direct-service offerings.
* This may be required for the simulation of long-haul inter-
national operations, where weekly rather than daily sched-
ules are the rule.
b) Linking of direct-service offerings into
connecting-service offerings.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between single-seg-
ment flights and their corresponding direct non-stop service
offerings, but multi-segment flights may generate direct serv-
ice entries in the offerings lists of many airport pairs.
Manual conversion from one form to the other would impose an
enormous burden to the game users. We thus find it mandatory
to have the computer perform this function.
It would also be highly desirable to have the computer
perform automatic connection generation. There are several
algorithms published that will perform this function (e.g.
Reference 10)*. Again, economic limitations have prevented
the implementation of an automatic connection generator, and
participants are reauested to identify all connecting service
offerings they wish to supply. Computer code has been pro-
vided, however, to aid the user in determining the physical
validity of such connections (e.g. sufficient connecting time
at the connecting airport).
*The problem of how to generalize the allocation of revenue
in an interline connection remains to be solved.
Thus, the participant specifies an input list of flight
itineraries with scheduled departure times and, in an interac-
tive conversational mode with the computer, gets a listing of
direct services by market, from which a list of connecting
services can be constructed with computer assistance.
2.4.3 Components of Asset and Financial Management
"Management" of assets and cash involves the determina-
tion of the assets (and cash) required to supply the services
represented by the participant's schedule, and the determina-
tion of the transactions required to secure such assets and
cash.
The only non-cash assets that will be modeled explicitly
are aircraft. All other resources necessary to run an airline
(e.g. ground facilities, reservation system computers, etc.)
will not be explicitly modeled. Its costs will have to be
aggregated to other measures of activity that somehow reflect
the use of these resources, such as number of passengers
enplaned or total number of aircraft block-hours (see "compo-
nents of cost", below).
- I - __ j , a I NiVNIINJI" I
The minimum flight equipment needs are automaticaly com-
puted from the participant-specified fliqht schedule. This
minimum can then be compared with the equipment available to
the participant as a result of his equipment transactions.
However, what action to take in case they don't match is left
as part of the individual aame's scenario rules (e.g. force an
automatic lease of the reauired aircraft). Also, the scenario
may require a fixed percentage of spare aircraft of each type.
The number and variety of forms that asset acquisition
and disposition may take (e.g. sales, purchases and leases for
aircraft, bonds, stocks, notes, for cash) makes it quite
impractical to attempt to build a complete computer model that
would cover all, or even most, of the real-world possibili-
ties. Modeling of these transactions requires two different
types of data processing:
a) The data processing associated with the determi-
nation of certain parameters of the transaction,
such as the interest at which a participant can
borrow money in the short-term or the current
selling price of a used aircraft.
b) The accounting of the cash flow consequences of
the transactions actually carried out by the game
participants.
The amount of data processing required for the first pur-
pose is moderate, and can be carried out manually (e.g. as a
table of interest rates vs. the firm's Debt/Equity ratio).
The accounting process, however, can be tedious, and since the
computer simulation is performing the total accounting for
each participant, we have decided to include the cash flow
resulting from all transactions in the computer simulaton.
This split requires that some data be exchanged between the
game scenario rules and the simulation, as shown in the dia-
gram of Figure 1. Chapter IV describes how this communication
is mechanized (via the so-called "simulation file").
A restriction curently placed on the financial transac-
tions is that they do not have periodic repayments of princi-
pal (e.g. mortgages). This is due to the structure of the
communications data between the game scenario and the simula-
tion. This restriction should be removed in subsequent game
improvements.
2.4.4 Components of Revenue
In the strict financial accounting sense, all revenue
produced by a company under normal circumstances is considered
"operating revenue" irregardless of its source. We will, how-
ever, use this term to denote the revenue originated by the
fare charged to each passenger (or ton of freight) actually
carried. Non-operating revenues then include government sub-
sidies (which may in fact depend on the services supplied),
the results of resource management (e.g. sale of assets) and
the results of other activities, such as crew training or
non-flying business.
Without demeaning the importance that income from these
peripheral activities may have in real-world air carriers, we
find them outside the scope of our interest, (air transporta-
tion), and thus will not consider them in the game. Govern-
ment subsidies will be considered as oart of an individual
game's scenario as required, since its modeling does not
require extensive data processing, and since the great variety
of forms they may take defies its being programmed as computer
code.
As in the case of financial transactions, the details of
specific asset transactions will be modeled by scenario param-
eters (e.g. market prices of aircraft and short-term interest
rate) although its cash flow effect, as with subsidies, will
be taken into consideration by the computerized participant
financial accounting process.
There is still the basic revenue from fares; in the real
world, the fare structure is quite complicated, and, under the
current deregulatory trend, is becoming more and more so.
Since we are not currently modeling multiple classes of demand
(e.g. business vs. pleasure travellers), there is no possibil-
ity of including multiple fares based on the class of service
(e.g. first, coach) in the game. On the other hand, it would
be easy to extend the fare structure based on the time of day
of the flight and the type of equipment used. However, we
have opted not to include it in this game mechanization, again
due to resource limitations. It is our claim that useful
results may be obtained even with single fares ("average
yield") for each city-pair, as long as each participant may
select its own yields*.
* The average yield per passenger on a city pair is defined as
the total revenue divided by the number of passengers, thus
averaging over all types of tariffs (day, night, excursion,
APEX, etc.)
2.4.5 Components of Cost
In our generalized model of air carrier operations (Fig-
ure 2), we can identify three sources of costs: asset manage-
ment costs, financial costs, and operational costs.
Asset management costs include the cost of acquiring,
keeping, and disposing of non-cash assets, limited in our case
to flight equipment. Some examples of this cost are the
depreciation of owned flight equipment, the lease payments for
leased equipment, and aircraft insurance. This cost may be
"negative", such as when an owned aircraft is leased out.
Note that the expenditure required to buy an aircraft is not a
cost.
Financial costs include the cost of acquiring the cash
needed to balance the firm's cash flow requirements. Again,
this cost can be negative (as when the interest from the
investment of excess cash exceeds the interest of the out-
standing debt).
Operations cost is simply "everything else". In our
scheme, we make it a function of the schedule, the total traf-
fic, and the total revenue. Our cost structure is directly
tied in to the measures of activity that are generated by the
simulation: block hours (for each aircraft), departures, pas-
sengers carried, etc. This structure is described in detail
in Section 3.6. Note that the traditional classification of
costs as "direct" and "indirect", while of great analytical
significance, is of little use for modeling purposes at this
level of detail.
A further element of "cost" are the taxes levied on the
participant airlines. The structure of real-world fiscal laws
is so complex and ever-changing, that it is not realistic to
attempt to model the exact taxation mechanism. We have
decided to include in this game three components of taxes:
a) A simple corporate income tax rate.
b) A simple capital gains tax rate.
c) An accumulative credit due to the Investment Tax
Credit (ITC), again made up of a simple rate.
The three rates can, of course, change during the game,
as part of a dynamic scenario. A problem unique to this par-
ticular "cost" is that in the real world it is a function of
the net income over a very specific span of time (the "fiscal
year"). Unless the simulation period coincides exactly with
the fiscal year, we must adopt one of two solutions:
a) Prorate the (annual) tax liability over each sim-
ulation period, based on the period's income.
b) Compute this expenditure only on those qame iter-
ations coinciding with the end of the fiscal
year.
The first approach has the disadvantage of overestimating
taxes (profitable and unprofitable periods cannot be averaged
out during the year). The second approach complicates the
structure and use of the game (more past history must be
saved, the results depend on the position in the fiscal cycle
of the period being simulated). We have selected the first
solution: taxes are computed every game iteration as if the
fiscal period was exactly one game period.
CHAPTER III
MODELS USED IN THE COMPUTER SIMULATION
This chapter describes the mathematical models used in
the game's computer simulation. These models must perform the
following functions during each iteration:
a) Transform the supply data from the participant's
format to a format compatible with that of the
demand function.
b) Determine total demand by market.
c) Allocate the demand and the revenue it produces
among the participant airlines.
d) Determine a number of cash flow elements, such as
total revenue, costs, etc. for each participant
(accounting function) and collect and summarize
system data (performance reporting function).
The software implementation of the computer simulation is
overviewed in the next chapter.
3.1 SUPPLY DATA TRANSFORMATION
A most convenient format for the user to specify the sup-
ply function is a list of flight itineraries and schedules. In
particular, for each flight, he must specify:
a) The type of aircraft used.
b) The itinerary.
c) The schedule of departure times (arrival times
can be computed by the program).
The format required by a market-oriented ("Origin- Desti-
nation") demand function such as we are using is a list of air
transportation services offered between each airport pair, as
in the Official Airline Guide (OAG). This list must contain
all the characteristics of the service that affect demand or
demand allocation (e.g. departure and arrival times, number of
stops, etc). The transformation of the supply data from the
user format to the market format requires two steps:
a) The determination of block times for each flight
segment.
b) The construction of the lists of service offer-
ings for every market.
Segment block times are required to compute flight times
(from which costs and equipment needs are computed), and
arrival times (which affect schedule feasibility and the
"desirability" of the flight). The block time of segment j of
flight i is computed as:
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where:
TB is the block time
ij
TS , TS are the ground and air maneuvering time at the
d a
departure and arrival airports, respectively
D is the great-circle distance between the airports
d,a
V is aircraft's average cruise speed
t
k k is the average fractional reduction in cruising
groundspeed due to the average west-to-east wind.
0 is the cosine of the mean course between the two
airports.
The reduction in the effective groundspeed due to the
average westerly winds is modeled as a fixed percentage of the
aircraft's airspeed (10% for k=0.1). This is a reasonable
approximation, since slow-flying aircraft also fly at low
altitudes, where the wind velocity is low, while fast aircraft
fly at altitudes where the effect of the wind is more pro-
nounced. This model must be improved if there is a mix of
subsonic and supersonic aircraft, since it overestimates the
effect of the wind on supersonic aircraft.
The ground and air maneuvering times are fixed for each
airport, and are assumed independent of the type of aircraft
used. This assumption is based on the fact that ground taxing
speeds are approximately the same for all aircraft, and, in
the air, approaches are usually executed on the basis of time,
rather than distance, with slower aircraft flying smaller
approach patterns. Also, the departure and arrival values are
averaged, and a single value is currently used for either a
departure or an arrival at a given airport.
Service offering lists for each airport pair contain two
types of entries: direct services, and connecting services.
Direct service entries are constructed by combining each
departure airport in the flight's itinerary with each arrival
airport. Thus, an itinerary ABC will generate three entries,
one each in the service list of airport pairs AB, AC and BC.
A check is made to see whether the departure airport and the
arrival airport are the same, to avoid a flight ABA generating
an entry AA. No check is currently made in the code against
the multiole generation of the same entry (e.g. a flight ABCBA
would generate two AB and two PA entries).
Connecting flight entries are not generated automati-
cally, and must be entered by the participants. Each connec-
tion is made up of the origin airport, the destination air-
port, two flights and a connecting airport. Checks are made
to ensure that:
a) The connecting airport is served by the first
flight after it serves the origin airport.
b) The connecting airport is served by the second
flight before it serves the destination airport.
c) The time between the first flight's arrival at
the connecting airport and the second flight's
departure from it is equal to or greater than a
minimum connecting time established for that air-
port.
Each service list entry contains the departure and
arrival times, number of stops, and the identity of the
flight(s) involved. In addition, connectina entries include a
number representing the fraction of revenue to be allocated to
the first flight making up the connection. Currently this
number is the ratio of the distance bewteen the origin and the
connecting airport and the distance between the connecting
airport and the destination airport. All distances used are
great-circle distances.
Since Origin-Destination demand is oriented in a region-
to-region fashion, we must allow for the fact that a region
may have more than one airport. In our mechanization, we
merge all the airports within the same region prior to con-
structing the service lists, so that these lists are indeed
region-to-region, rather than airport-to-airport. This is
equivalent to the assumption that all the airports within the
region are equally desirable from a demand point of view.
This may not always be the case, and Chapter V mentions a
method of modeling differences in airport desirability within
the same region.
3.2 TOTAL DEMAND MODEL
The determination of total demand for air transportation
is so essential to almost every aspect of airline operations
analysis, that considerable effort has been devoted to design-
ing, calibrating, and verifying demand models. The current
state-of-the-art in demand modeling for a city-pair market
seems to be represented by the work of Eriksen, Taneja, and
Scalea (References 12, 13 and 14). In Reference 12, Eriksen
reviews the theoretical (utility theory) economics of air
transportation demand, as well as the most recent work done.
He then postulates a city-pair demand model which he then pro-
ceeds to calibrate and test statistically. We will use a sim-
plified form of his model.
Eriksen's full demand model includes the effects of three
parameters:
a) A Socio-Economic index of mutual economic activ-
ity between the two cities (actually, regions)
that make up a market (e.g. population).
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b) A standard fare. In a previous work (Reference
14), Eriksen, Scalea and Taneja had shown that
the use of standard coach fare is statistically
equivalent to the use of other, more sophisti-
cated, weighted average fares.
c) A "level of service" index, a non-dimensional
number that is a measure of the quality of the
air transportation service offered in a market,
on the basis of a very simple theory of utility
of time vs. utility of air transportation (i.e.
neglecting passenger aircraft preference, carrier
image, on-board amenities and the like).
Fare and level of service are, in our game, endogenous
variables. The Socio-Economic index would include all the
variables which are external to our scope. Thus we include
this parameter as game scenario data, along with the elastici-
ties with respect to the other two parameters. The equation
defining the total (unidirectional) demand for market m is:
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where:
D is the nominal demand for market m.
nom
m
L ,F are the nominal level of service and nominal
nom nom
m m fare that go with the nominal demand.
L ,F are the actual level of service and average
m m
fare in the market simulated.
e ,e are the level of service and fare elastici-
L F
ties of demand, respectively.
As an initial approximation, encouraged by the results in
Reference 14, we use the simple algebraic mean of the fares
offered as the average fare in the market. Future research in
demand estimation may indicate the need for a more sophisti-
cated "average" fare, e.g. weighting each carrier's fare by
the level of service offered by that carrier.
The level of service index is a measure of how closely
the service offered by all carriers in the market approximates
a "perfect service" which has a minimum possible flight time
(as produced by a non-stop jet service), and a zero waiting
time (as would be produced by an extremely large number of
departures per hour). The index is computed as:
t=24
L = D(t;DT)
t=0
min
(all s)
(T + t - ti)
s D
dt (3.3)
is the fraction of total demand desiring a
departure at time t.
is the non-stop jet flight time.
is service s's flight time.
is service s's departure time.
is the sum of T plus the time zone difference
J
between the market's origin and destination
airports.
The quantity in the denominator is the lowest total trip
time of all services offered in the market, for passengers
whishing to depart at time t. This total trip time is made up
of the actual flight time, plus the absolute magnitude of the
wait time, sometimes called "displacement time". The ratio
between the jet time (zero displacement time) and the best
where:
D (t; DT)
T
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trip time available is the level of service index for
passengers desiring to depart at time t. The average level of
service index is simply the integral of this ratio over the
entire day, each time weighted by the fraction of total demand
desiring to depart at that time. In our mechanization, we
divide the day into 48 half-hour "slices", and the integral is
reduced to a simple summation.
In order to compute the level of service, we must know
the function D(t;DT), the variation of demand with the time of
day. As its notation implies, this function is also dependent
on the difference between the local departure time and the
local arrival time, DT. That is, the desirability of a depar-
ture at local time t is also a function of the correspoinding
local arrival time. The local arrival time itself is a func-
tion of the flight time and the time zone differences, the sum
of which is DT. Thus, a 7:00 P.M. departure from Los Angeles
is very desirable in the case of an 8:00 P.M. arrival at San
Francisco, but may not be that desirable in the case of a 3:00
A.M local arrival at Boston.
Again, we follow Eriksen's work in the determination of
the time-of-day variability of demand. The derivation of this
function is shown in Appendix B, along with some representa-
tive values for selected DT's.
3.3 DEMAND ALLOCATION
The demand allocation process is the key element in this
game's environment simulation. Previous efforts in modeling
this process do not seem to be satisfactory for our purposes.
Boeing's SSFX program (SSF=Seats, Stops, Frequencies),
described in Reference 11, allocates total demand in a market
to each service offering proportionally to the factor:
W = S P F SF (3.4)
i a a i i
where:
S is the seating capacity of the aircraft (type a)
a
used in service i.
P is a passenger preference index for aircraft -a.
a
F is service i's frequency.
i
SF is an index inversely proportional to the number
i
of stops in service i.
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The above model is rather limited from a passenger
behavior point of view: a three-stop flight arriving at 6 P.M.
may be more desirable than a non-stop flight that arrives at 3
A.M. Similarly, we contend that it is demand that causes car-
riers to use larger aircraft, and not the use of larger air-
craft that causes demand.
McDonnell-Douglas' ASPEM (Airline Planning and Evaluation
Model), as described in Reference 10, does try to take into
consideration the effect of the flight's departure time. In
this case, the demand is allocated proportionally to the fac-
tor:
-x
W = S P F (T) D (3.5)
i a a i i TD
i
where:
S is the seating capacity of the aircraft (type a) used
a
(as in the previous model)
P is a passenger preference index for aircraft type a
a
(as above).
F is service i's frequency (as above).
i
T is service i's flight time.
i
x is a subjective exponent, ranging from 1 to 6.
D is a factor measuring the effect of service i's
TD
i departure time (TD).
This model represents an improvement over SSFX in that it
recognizes trip time as a behavioral preference factor in the
selection of a flight by a passenger. The use of a variable
(and, as it seems, subjective) exponent points to a major dif-
ficulty in modeling passenger behavior: if two otherwise iden-
tical services differ, in their flight time, by a few minutes,
why would anyone bother to take the slower one? The rate at
which preference decays with flight time is controlled by the
exponent x (for x infinity, nobody would take the slowest
flight).
Neither model is sensitive to the influence of actual
load on demand allocation, i.e. both allocate all the demand
according to the initially-determined weights, and load fac-
tors above 100% are not uncommon results. The underlaying
assumption is that the model users will then correct this
state of affairs, drive the load factors down to around 50%,
and the model will be valid again. It is therefore not sur-
prising that both models match auite well "historical experi-
ence", even though many cases can be made up where these mod-
els produce quite unreasonable results. Since it is one of
our requirements that out-of-the-ordinary conditions should be
modeled reasonably, we cannot use this simple approach.
The departure time index used by ASPEM is an example of
"indifference line" utility modeling. In this approach, a
time-of-day variation of demand (such as D(t;DT) used in the
previous Section) is assumed. Given N competitive departures
throughout the day, ASPEM's index is simply the partition of
that demand to each service based on the midpoints between the
services' departure times. The pitfalls of this approach (and
that of a slightly more sophisticated one where the midpoints
are weighted by the demand function) can be illustrated with a
simple example.
Assume that the day is divided into four time slices,
with the demand distribution shown in Figure 4. Assume fur-
thermore that there are three flights, one at time 2-dt, one
at time 2+dt, and one at time 3 (dt being a very small time).
Experience indicates that two flights departing very close to
each other are perceived as identical services by passengers,
and thus should receive approximately the same fraction of the
Fraction of
total demand
Flight 2
Flight 1 )
"Indifference line"
between Flight 1
and Flight 2
Resulting allocation:
Flight 3 Fliqht 1 0.4
Flight 2 0.2
Flight 3 0.4
Time
of
day
Figure 4.- Illustration of Indifference line
demand allocation.
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0
total demand each. ASPEM's algorithm, on the other hand, will
divide the day into the intervals shown, allocating 40% of the
demand to the first flight, 20% to the second, and 40% to the
third.
This approach becomes even more unrealistic if the second
flight's fare is lower than the first flight's (none of the
above-mentioned programs considers price competition). In
this case, it is very likely that some passengers will gladly
wait 2dt in order to pay a lower fare (time-money substitution
effect).
We recognize that there are two different mechanisms at
work in the demand allocation process:
a) The basic ("behavioral") passenger preference for
one flight, based on service attributes like trip
time, departure time, fare, aircraft type, air-
line image, etc.
b) The "externally imposed" constraint of not find-
ing space on the preferred flight, thus diverting
some passengers to a "second preference" flight
("demand shedding").
It must be pointed out that demand shedding occurs before
a 100% average load factor is reached. This is due to the
day-to-day statistical variation in demand. Indeed, under
certain assumptions, significant demand shedding may occur at
average load factors as low as 50%.This will be treated in the
next Section.
We therefore divide the load allocation process into two
steps:
a) The determination of an initial ("behavioral")
desirability for each competitive service offered
in the market. This would be the fraction of
demand allocated to that entry if supply exceeded
demand by such an extent that no demand shedding
occured.
b) The incremental allocation of demand, so that
segment loads build up gradually, and demand is
shed from highly-loaded service offerings to
less-loaded service offerings.
3.4 BEHAVIORAL DESIRABILITY PARAMETER
This parameter is determined based on the passeqer's
utility of time vs. money. Other utilities (e.g. aircraft
type, on-board amenities, airline image) are not considered.
They may be included by converting them to "equivalent min-
utes" or "equivalent dollars".
The day is divided into N "slices" of 24/N hours each.
For each slice, consider the fraction of the daily demand
desiring air transportation during that time. This fraction
is obtained from the same D(t;DT) function used to determine
Level of Service. These passengers consider all possible
services offered throughout the day. Each service has associ-
ated with it a total trip time (including the displacement
time from the slice under consideration) and a certain price.
A price-time substitution function is assumed, and a "beha-
vioral desirability parameter" is computed for each service
offering for the passengers of each time slice. The desira-
bility of service i for the passengers from time of day slice
t is:
min
D = (-)
i,t T
x e
f
exp ( x e - )
F f
(3.6)
is the lowest total trip time (flight plus displa-
cement) among all service entries, from the
center of the time slice considered.
T' is the total trip time of service entry i, corrected
i
for a certain "deadband" (see below).
e ,e are the trip time and fare elasticities.
T F
f is the (simple algebraic) mean fare offered.
f is the fare associated with service i.
i
x is an empirical elasticity multiplier.
Once the parameters for all the offerings are computed
for a single time-of-day slice, they are normalized (divided
by their sum). The total desirability of the i-th service
offering is the summation of this parameter over the entire
day, weighted by the time-of-day demand function:
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where:
T
min
D D(t;DT)
i,t
D = .(3.7)
1,t
The behavioral desirability formula compares the trip
time of each service entry with the trip time of the "best"
(i.e. lowest trip time) entry. Since each time of day slice
has a finite width, we would arbitrarily favor entries whose
departure times happen to be close to the slice's midooints.
This is the reason for the "deadband" in the entry's trip
time: for all entries, we subtract one-half the width of the
time slice, with the provision that no trio time can become
smaller than the best trip time. This is expressed mathemati-
cally as:
T' = min (T , T - 0.5 (24/N) ) (3.8)
i min i
This tends to "crowd-in" flights close to the least dis-
placement time flight, so that all flights within one-half
time slice of the best flight are considered equal to the best
one. Figure 5 shows, aualitatively, the variation of the
behavioral desirability parameter with trip time (including
BEHAVIORAL
DESIRABILITY
PARAMETER
PRICE-TRIP TIME
INDIFFERENCE LINES
PRICE RATIO
1.2
1.4 RATIO OF TRIP TIM
TO MINIML [BEST] TRIP TIME
1.2 1.5
Figure 5.- Behavioral desirability parameter function.
the deadband) and price. As in the case of the ASPEM model,
the coefficient x is quite arbitrary. In this case, however,
x affects both the time and price desirabilities, so that the
ratio (cross-elasticity of time vs. price) remains equal to
the ratio of the price and level of service elasticities for
the market (regardless of the value of x)*. This allows the
use of large values of x (representing the behavioral pattern
that the indifference-line approach tried to emulate) while
retaining the price-time cross elasticity determined by the
ratio of the price elasticity to the trip time elasticity.
The variation of the desirability with respect to fare is
exponential, rather than the conventional potential form, to
avoid the numerical problems associated with small values of
fare. Since "unrealistically" small fares may be sometimes
used as strategic competitive weapons, we must allow for the
possible occurance of very small fares.
To illustrate the entire behavioral desirability determi-
nation process, we compute in Figure 6 the desirability param-
eter for the sample case used in Figure 4. For clarity, we
will use a simple time-desirability function (no price differ-
* Note that while the elasticity with respect to trip time is
constant, the elasticity with respect to price is propor-
tional to the price ratio; thus the above comment apply to
the point elasticities.
Desirability
Demand
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Flight 2
Flight 1
Flight 3
ED
tl t2 t3 t4
Figure 6.-
U
Time of day
0 1 2
Displacement
time
(assume zero flight
time)
Illustration of behavioral desirability
parameter computation.
(j
Time of Demand Demand allocated to
day slice fraction 1 2 3
1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0
2 0.4 0.16 0.16 0.08
3 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.1
4 0.2 0 0 0.2
Total: 1.0 0.31 0.31 0.38
-
D(t;dt)
ences), which takes the discrete values of 1, 0.5 and 0 for
time differences of 0, 1, and 2 units respectively. Also for
simplicity, we disregard the flight times (i.e. trip time =
displacement time).
Passengers desiring departure during the first time slice
of Figure 6 have the choice of waiting 1 time unit for flights
1 and 2, or two time units for flight 3. According to our
time-desirability function, the relative preferences of these
flights for these passengers are, respectively, 0.5, 0.5 and
0. We thus allocate the 20% of the demand that corresponds to
the first time slice proportionally to these weights, for a
total of 0.1 to each of the two first flights. Similarly, for
passengers from the second time slice, the preferences are 1,
1, and 0.5, and the 40% demand corresponding to the slice are
allocated as indicated in the table of Figure 6.
After all four time slices have been allocated, we sum
the desirabilities of each flight from each time slice, and we
get 31% allocated to each of the first two flights, and 38%
allocated to the third flight.
Proponents of Indifference-line models may argue that
there is no reason for passengers in time slice 2 to prefer
anything but flights 1 and 2, and therefore the time-desira-
bility function should exhibit a sharp cutoff, leading to the
indifference-line mode (except maybe for the effect of the
deadband). In reality, the error induced by "stealing" slice
2 passengers in favor of flight 3 is partially compensated by
the stealing of slice 3 passengers from flight 3, in favor of
flights 1 and 2. The possible residual error is a small price
to pay for the superior behavior of this model in the presence
of closely-spaced, "interfering" flights.
In our approach, multi-stop flights are "penalized" with
respect to non-stop flights only by their naturally longer
trip times (due both to longer flight times and gate times at
intermediate airports). It may be argued that the inconven-
ience of repeated take-offs and landings reduces the utility
of a multi-stop flight beyond the mere increase in trip time.
On the other hand, it remains to be proved that passengers
will actually wait for a non-stop flight in preference to a
multi-stop flight that will take them to their destination
earlier.
Multi-stop flight penalization could be implemented
either by adding to their trip time a "stop penalty time", or
by weighting displacement time less than flight time in the
computation of total trip time for passenger preference pur-
poses. We do not use either of these approaches for multi-
stop flights, but we do penalize connecting flights with a
"connection correction" trip time penalty due to the disutil-
ity caused by the finite probability of missing the connec-
tion.
3.5 INCREMENTAL LOAD BUILD-UP AND DEMAND SHEDDING
In the real world, the passenger's behavioral preferences
are modified by the availability of space. We will not model
the airline's "blocking off" practices, i.e. setting away
blocks of seats on specified fliqhts for various purposes
(e.q. sell to travel agencies). We assume that a single
flight segment is saturated on any one day, when the load fac-
tor for that day reaches 100%.
The effect of day-to-day statistical variations in total
demand is such that the average load factor over any period of
time may never reach 100%. For example, consider two days on
a market with 100 seats/day capacity. On the first day, demand
is 150 passengers but only 100 can be carried . On the sec-
*It is assumed all 150-100=50 passengers not carried are
lost, i.e. none of them show up the next day, namely, daily
ond day, 50 passengers show up, and all are carried. Even
though the total demand is 200 passengers (suggesting an aver-
age load factor of 100%) actually only 150 passengers are car-
rier, yielding an average load factor of 75%.
The ratio of the "theoretical" (100% in the example) and
the "actual" (75%) load factors depends on the statistical
model assumed for the day-to-day variation of demand. We will
asume a Gaussian, or Normal, statistical distribution of
demand. Appendix C shows how the curves of Figure 7 are
derived from the assumption that the standard deviation is
one-half the mean. This curve (Figure 7a) shows the theoreti-
cal and actual average load factors resulting from a given
demand/capacity ratio. Observe how the actual average value
diverges from the theoretical value starting at a theoretical
load factor of 50%. This effect is called "load factor tail-
off". The data of Figure 7a is re-plotted in Figure 7b to
show the fraction of demand carried as a function of the same
ratio of demand to capacity.
The actual load build-up process cannot be accomplished
in a single step. The reason is illustrated with the simple
example of Figure 8. Consider two markets, with a total
demand is a stochastic random variable.
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Figure 7a.- Load factor tail-off.
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Figure 8a.- Example of non-iterative load buildup:
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Figure 8b.- Example of non-iterative load buildup: market A-C first
demand of 12 and 9 units, respectively. Each market is served
by three offerings, made up of non-stop, one-stop and connect-
ing flights. A total of five flights and six flight segments
are used to offer these services. Market A-B's service offer-
ings have initial desirability parameters equal to 0.25, 0.25
and 0.5; A-C's entries have values of 0.67, 0.16, and 0.16,
respectively. If the demand is allocated in the order shown
(market A-B first, then market A-C) we end up with the alloca-
tion shown in Figure 8a. One-fourth of the total A-B demand
(three units) goes to Flight l's first segment, and another
three units to Flight 2. Since the aircraft capacity is three
units, these flights become saturated. Similarly, of the six
units of demand that would correspond to Flight 4, only three
can be allocated.
When market A-C's turn arrives, it finds two of its three
service offerings using flight segments that have already been
saturated. Thus, the new desirabilities have the values 0, 1,
and 0 respectively. Only three units of market A-C's demand
can be allocated (to Flight 3). If the order is inverted, we
obtain the allocation shown in Figure 8b. Thus the order in
which markets are processed affects the results of the alloca-
tion when high load factors are present.
To solve this problem, we divide the process in N steps
and allocate l/N-th of the total demand during each step.
Furthermore, we only allocate to each entry a fraction of its
share, based on the load of its most loaded segment
("bottleneck" segment) according to the tail-off function of
Figure 7. The load allocation iteration stops when all mar-
kets are either:
a) Fully allocated, i.e. all the demand has been
assigned to one flight or another.
b) Saturated, i.e. all the service entries for that
market have reached load factors such that no
more than an e of the demand may be allocated in
the next step ( E being a run parameter).
Going back to the example (Figure 9), we now divide the
process in three steps, and will attempt to allocate one third
of the total demand (four units for A-B, three units for A-C)
during each step. Thus, we allocate one unit of A-B demand
(one-quarter of one-third of 12 units), to Flight l's first
segment, one unit to Flight 2, and two units to Flight 4. For
sake of simplicity we will ignore the load factor tail-off
effect (theoretical load factor = actual load factor).
MARKET A-B
(12 units)
MARKET A-C
(9 units)
- -- TOTAL DEMAND
SERVICE LISTS:
Flight #
Figure 9.- Example of
TOTAL SUPPLY
First segment Second segment
1 A B C
2  A B
3 A C
4 A B
5 B C
iterative load buildup process.
When we allocate market A-C's first third, we find just
enough space in Flight l's first segment to fit in the two
units of demand. The allocations for Flights 3 and the 4-5
connection (half a unit each) fit, thus ending the iteration.
Before allocating market A-B's second third, we must re-nor-
malize its desirabilities, since the first entry involved
Flight l's first segment, now saturated. The new normalized
desirability indices are 0.33 for the first entry, and 0.67
for the second one. This leads us to allocate 1.33 units of
demand to Flight 2 and 2.66 to Flight 4, where there is room
for only 1 unit. We have thus saturated Flight 4, and we have
not been able to allocate all of market A-B's second third.
Back to market A-C, we are left with only one entry, the
one pointing to Flight 3. Its re-normalized desirability,
therefore, becomes 1. However, of the 3 units of demand that
we would like to allocate, Flight 3 has room for only two.
This saturates that flight, and therefore the market. The
other market (A-B) can only dispose of 2/3 more units of
demand (to Flight 2) before its service list is depleted. As
it can be seen, the resulting distribution is quite different
from those of Figure 8a and Figure 8b.
In the computer code used, this process is modified by
the introduction of the load factor tail-off ratio of Figure
7, before a flight's share of demand is allocated. For this
purpose, the load of the "critical segment" (most loaded seg-
ment in the flight(s)) is compared with the fraction of total
demand (all iterations) that would be allocated to this entry
based exclusively on the entry's current desirability. This
is used as an approximation of what the final load factor in
that segment would be (barring load shedding). The theoreti-
cal-actual ratio corresponding to this theoretical load factor
(Figure 7) is used to reduce the allocated demand so that the
resulting critical seqment load factor is no greater than the
desired (actual) one. As the bottleneck segment load factor
approaches its limit value, the demand allocated to it becomes
increasingly small. Therefore, the number of iterations
needed to allocate the initial demand may be different from
the number initially selected to determine the demand slice.
The allocation iteration for a flight is terminated when the
additional demand added by an iteration becomes smaller than a
certain value E.
This process is illustrated by the simple example of Fig-
ure 10. In this example, a simple linear tail-off function is
assumed; a 100-seat aircraft is used to serve (exclusively)
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Figure 10.- Example of load factor tail-off simulation process.
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two markets, sharing one ("bottleneck") flight segment. Mar-
ket A's total demand is 20 passengers/day, that of market B 80
passengers/day. The simple (no tail-off) allocation process
described above would fit all 100 passengers in the 100-seat
aircraft; however, the load factor tail-off function of Figure
10 indicates that for a Demand/Capacity ratio of 1, only 80%
of the demand is carried; we would thus expect to carry only
16 passengers from market A, and 64 from market B.
This process is carried out simultaneously with the
incremental loading process described above; assuming that
five loading iterations are desired, we would, in our example,
allocate 4 and 16 passengers from each market during each
iteration. The tail-off process begins with the computation
of the current "expected demand/capacity ratio":
D + L
(3.9)
exp c
where:
D is the remaining demand on the market
r
L is the current aircraft load (on the "bottleneck"
S
segment).
c is the aircraft capacity.
In our example, the initial iteration through market A
yields an expected D/C of 0.2. This D/C is then entered in
the load factor tail-off function used, (Figure 10 in our
example, Figure 7 in the actual game), producing the expected
final load factor (0.2 in our example). Thus, it is expected
that only 20 seats will be occupied. Since there are no seats
curently occupied, the maximum number of seats that can be
allocated ("max slice") is 20-0=20, well in excess of the 4
passengers that we would like to allocate during this alloca-
tion iteration; thus all 4 passengers are allocated, and no
tail-off occurs. Similarly, in Market B, we have an expected
D/C of 0.84, corresponding to a final load factor of 0.726,
*
yielding a max slice of 72.6-4=68.6 available seats
* Note that since we are dealing with with average values, it
is proper to use fractional seats and "fractional passen-
gers".
The available seats continue to exceed the demand alloca-
tion slice until the fourth iteration, where only 3.1 seats
are available in market A. Thus, the demand allocated is
reduce from 4 to 3.1. Similarly, market B's slice is reduced
from 16 to 14.8 passengers. During the last and fifth itera-
tion, there is no more room (max slice <= 0) for either mar-
ket, and thus the allocation process is terminated. The total
number of passengers carried from each market are 15.1 and
62.8 respectively. This performance was judged satisfactory,
although there is some room for improvement.
3.6 INCOME AND COSTS STRUCTURE
There are three possible sources of income in our model
structure: revenue from operations, income from asset and
financial managements transactions, and external sources. In
the case of asset management income, two values of income are
kept (following traditional accounting practices), one for
financial reporting, one for fiscal reporting (taxes).
Revenue from operations includes the product of the pas-
sengers carried on each market by the single fare charged on
that market. This revenue is computed during the demand allo-
cation process, and is allocated to the flight carrying the
passengers which originated that revenue. The revenue from an
interline connecting service is allocated proportionally to
the great circle distances between origin and connecting air-
port, and connecting airport to destination.
Income from asset and financial management includes:
a) Capital gains from the sale of aircraft, modeled
as the difference between the sale price (deter-
mined by scenario data and rules) and the corre-
sponding book value (straight-line for financial
reporting, Double-Declining Balance for fiscal
reporting).
b) Income from the lease-out of aircraft. Again,
the lease-out rate and terms are determined by
scenario data and rules.
c) Interest from the investment of cash on hand.
This is modeled as a simple rate (aqain, from
scenario data) applied to the cash on hand at the
beginning of a simulation period.
The only source of external revenue considered in this
mechanization is government subsidy payments. Again, the
rates and terms are to be determined by the scenario data and
rules.
As mentioned in 2.4.5, the cost structure must perforce
match the endogenous data produced by the simulation. We have
grouped the costs modeled into five groups, each containing
several cost coefficients; it is the task of the game scenario
data to correlate the coefficients with the real-world costs
being simulated. Some of these cost elements are computed for
the entire simulation period, while others are computed daily.
The latter are converted to costs ner simulation period by
multiplication by the appropriate factor (number of days per
simulation period). The five groups are:
Group 1: flight-associated costs. These are costs calcu-
lated for each segment of a flight, and are made up of:
- A fixed quantity per segment: DOC/OP
- A term proportional to the block time: DOC/H * BLKTIME
- A quantity for the departure and arrival airports, each
composed of a fixed term plus a term proportional to
the number of seats: Cl + C2 * SEATS
The parameters Cl and C2 are unique for each airport.
The parameters DOC/OP and DOC/H are unique for each aicraft
type. The total flight costs per day are the sum of these
three components over all the flight segments flown.
Group 2: aircraft fixed costs. These costs are independ-
ent of the utilization of the aircraft, and are made up of:
- A fixed quantity for each day the aircraft is availa-
ble: AC/DAY
- For aircraft owned, the depreciation cost per simula-
tion period. Two depreciation schemes are used, a
straight line for finacial reporting, a Double Declin-
ing Balance for tax computation.
- For aircraft leased-in, the lease costs per simulation
period.
Group 3: Global activity-related costs (all per simula-
tion period):
- A term proportional to the total available seat-miles:
C/ASM * ASM.
- A term proportional to the total revenue
passenger-miles: C/RPM * RPM.
- A term proportional to the total number of passengers
carried (enplanements): C/ENP * ENP.
- A term proportional to the total nassenger revenue:
C/REV * REV.
The parameters C/ASM, C/RPM, C/ENP and C/REV are uniaue
for each participant.
Group 4: Financial costs. This is simply the sum of the
periodic payments per simulation period required by all the
debts outstanding for the participant.
Group 5: Taxes. Taxes are made up of a simple rate on
corporate income (everything but capital gains), another sim-
ple rate on capital gains, and an accumulating ITC (Investment
Tax Credit) proportional to the capital expenditures (aircraft
acquisition). Two simplifying assumptions are made about the
ITC:
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a) It can be carried forward indefinitely, but not
backwards (retroactive application).
b) It is used as soon as there are any tax liabili-
ties to which it can be applied (i.e. there is no
discretion on their use by part of the partici-
pant).
These simplifications were made to reduce the number of
participant decision variables required. Corporate gain and
capital gain are computed using the Double Declining Balance
aircraft depreciation expenses and book value.
3.7 PERFORMANCE REPORTING AND ACCOUNTING MODELS
Examples of the printouts produced by the simulation can
be found in the next Chapter. These include a number of terms
which are defined here. In the case of revenues and costs,
this is basically a labelling procedure, and the choice of
labels reflects the author's opinion on how real-world costs
should be allocated to the terms of the costs structure men-
tioned in the previous Section. The financial reports include
the three standard forms (Statement of Earnings, Balance
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Sheet, and Changes in Financial Position), plus a number of
analysis-oriented ratios.
The Statement of Earnings (S of E) is made up of the fol-
lowing items:
a) Passenger revenues - as defined in 2.4.4
b) Other revenue - subsidy payments, aircraft lease-
out and interest income.
c) Flying expenses - the total Group 1 expenses
described in the previous section.
d) Passenger services - the sum of the enplanement
and RPM terms in cost Group 3.
e) Reservations and sales - the term proportional to
passenger revenue in cost Group 3.
f) General and administration - the sum of the term
proportional to ASM in Group 3 plus the first
term of the aircraft fixed costs of Group 2.
g) Depreciation and amortization - the aircraft
depreciation costs based on straight-line depre-
ciation.
h) Interest expense - the financial costs (Group 4).
i) Lease costs - from Group 2.
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I 1 - W,
j) Earnings before taxes and extraordinary items:
a+b-c-d-e-f-g-h-i.
k) Corporate income taxes - as defined above.
1) Investment Tax Credit - as defined above.
m) Extraordinary items - sale of aircraft.
n) Capital gains tax - as defined above.
o) Net earnings (also called "Net after-tax
income"): j-k+l+m-n.
The components of the Statement of Changes in Financial
Position (SCFP) are as follows:
a) Net after tax income - from the balance sheet
(term o).
b) Depreciation expense - term g) above.
c) Book value of aircraft sold - using the straight
line depreciation.
d) Other sources - the cash inflow from all finan-
cial transactions with a positive initial cash
flow (e.g. a loan).
e) Uses of working capital - two components:
- Equipment aquisitions.
- Debt redemption (final payment).
f) Change in working capital: a+b+c+d-e.
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- The Balance Sheet (BS) also conforms to usual accounting
practices, and is made up of the following items:
a) Cash and equivalent - the accumulated changes in
working capital (item f, above).
b) Flight equipment - the sum of the original pur-
chase price of all owned aircraft.
c) Accumulated depreciation - the difference between
the purchase price and the straight-line book
value.
d) Current liabilities - the sum of the final cash
flow of all financial transactions with a nega-
tive final cash flow and a remaining life equal
to or less than one year.
e) Other liabilities - two components:
- The final cash flow of all transactions with a nega-
tive cash flow and remainina life greater than one
year.
- The difference between the straight line and Double-
Declining Balance book values of aircraft, multi-
plied by the corporate gain tax rate (deferred
taxes).
f) Equity: a+b-c-d-e.
The operating statistics terms are defined as follows:
104
a) Total seat-miles (ASM) - the sum over all flight
segments of the segment length times the aircraft
capacity.
b) Revenue passenger-miles (RPM) - the sum over all
flight segments of the segment load times the
segment length.
c) Total enplanements - the sum over all flights of
the number of passengers allocated to each
flight.
d) Average daily equipment utilization - the sum
over all segments of the segment block time
divided by the total number of aircraft usable
(owned plus lease-in minus leased-out) by the
participant.
e) Average stage length - the sum over all flight
segments of the segment length, divided by the
number of segments.
f) Average load factor - RPM/ASM.
Items a,b and c represent daily values, and are multi-
plied by the number of days per simulation period to obtain
the total value over that period.
The financial statistics terms are defined as follows:
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a) Return on owner's equity - Net after tax income
divided by equity.
b) Return on sales - Net after tax income divided by
operating revenues (S of E items a+b).
c) Return on assets -
Net earnings + Interest expense (1-Corp. Tax rate )
Cash + Flight equipment - Accumulated dep.
d) Return on invested capital -
Net earnings + Interest expense (1-Corp. Tax rate )
Cash + Flight eq. - Accum. dep. - Current liab.
e) Investment turnover - Operating revenues (S of E
items a+b) divided by invested capital (3.S.
items a+b-c-d).
f) Asset turnover - Operating revenues divided by
assets (B.S. items a+b-c).
g) Equity turnover - Operating revenues divided by
equity (B.S. item f).
h) Current ratio - Cash and equivalent divided by
current liabilities.
i) Debt/Equity ratio - Other liabilities minus
deferred taxes (first component of B.S. item e),
divided by equity.
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j) Debt/Asset ratio - Other liabilities minus defer-
red taxes, divided by assets (B.S. items a+b-c).
k) Times interest coverage - Earnings before taxes
and extraordinary items plus interest expense (S
of E items j+h), divided by the interest expense
(S of E item j).
Items a through g are annualized by multiplying them by
the ratio (number of days per simulation period)/365 (days per
year).
3.8 ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS
In addition to the main functions covered in the previous
sections, there are a number of additional functions that must
be performed to make the game usable. The three most impor-
tant ones are:
a) Verification of schedule realizability.
b) Aircraft flow balance verification.
c) Aircraft requirements determination.
Schedule realizability implies simply that the departure
time for a flight segment cannot be earlier than the arrival
time for the previous segment, plus a certain "gate residence
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time" or gate time. Each participant airline is assigned a
fixed minimum intersegment gate residency time for all air-
ports and all aircraft types. The interactive data input pro-
gram will not accept a flight whose departure schedule vio-
lates the minimum intersegment qate time.
The aircraft flow balance and aircraft count procedures
are required because game participants enter each flight as an
individual item, without assigning them to any particular air-
craft ("tail number" assignement), and thus it is non-trivial
to determine flow balance and aircraft counts. These two
functions are interlaced, and are carried out as follows:
a) For each aircraft type used by the participant,
the airports where flights initiate or terminate
are identified (intermediate stop airports are
iqnored).
b) For each of these airports, a flight flow list is
created. This is a time-ordered list, from 0000
*
hours to 2400 hours universal (not local) time ,
of the carrier's flight departures and arrivals
at that airport.
"Universal" departure or arrival time is the departure or
arrival time uncorrected for the airport's time zone.
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c) The number of departures and arrivals at each
station must balance, or else that airport is
labelled as an aircraft "source" or "sink".
d) If the flow does match, a count is started at
zero at the beginning of the day, and the flight
flow list traversed: for each departure, the
count is reduced by one, for each arrival, the
count is increased by one.
e) The minimum number (by definition less than or
equal to zero) reached by the count is the number
of aircraft of the type being counted that stay
overnight at that station (e.g. if the count is
-3, three aircraft stay overnight).
f) Each flight segment of each flight using that
type of aircraft is examined. If the sum of the
departure time plus the segment block time is
greater than 24 hours (universal time), then that
airplane is in flight at midnight.
g) The total number of aircraft of a given type
required by the participant is the sum of all the
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station's overnight stav counts plus all the
midnight-flyinq segments.
The flight arrival times used in the above process are
incremented by a "minimum interflight gate time", to simulate
the gate time required to turn over a flight. This minimum
interflight time is assumed independent of the airport and
aircraft type, but is unique to each participant. This time
may be different from the intersegment stop time for a multis-
top flight mentioned above.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTATION AND SAMPLE USAGE
This chapter describes the current implementation of the
game at the Flight Transportation Laboratory of the Department
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. A very simple example is analyzed in detail to
illustrate the concepts of the previous Chapters. The first
experience with the game used as a teaching tool at M.I.T. is
reviewed.
4.1 SOFTWARE MECHANIZATION
The large number of decisions that the participants must
input, and the complexity of the decisions process indicates
the convenience of providing participants with conversational,
interactive access to the data bases that contain their input
decision variables. Conversational access offers the follow-
ing advantages:
a) It can be made easier to learn and use than fix-
ed-format (e.g. punched cards) methods.
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b) Clerical mistakes, such as keypunch errors, can
be immediately detected and corrected.
c) Some less trivial mistakes, such as repeated
flight numbers, can also be detected at the time
the data is entered.
d) Instant and structured access to the entire data
base can help in the decision process itself.
e) If programmed to perform some reduction of the
data (e.g. computation of segment flight times,
aircraft count, etc) the access programs may be
used as analysis and decision-making aids.
f) The access programs may detect (and prevent) par-
ticipant "cheating".
The last three features allow the participants to perform
part of their decision-makinq (i.e. the scheduling part) at
the same time that they enter the data at the computer termi-
nal. Thus, a certain amount of interaction is possible; for
example, if the resulting aircraft flow is not balanced, the
conversational program indicates at which stations the unbal-
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ance occurs, and can display the flight flow through that sta-
tion, so that an appropriate fix may be found.
The resulting overall software structure is presented in
Figure 11. The data required to drive the computer-based sim-
ulation is divided between three data sets:
a) A "Universe" file, containing data not likely to
change from run to run (e.g. airport latitudes
and longitudes).
b) A "Simulation run" file, containing data that is
unique to the game iteration being run, such as
some participant parameters, global demand modi-
fiers, dynamic scenario data, etc.
c) A "Participant" file for each participant in the
game, containing both the input decision varia-
bles and results from past game iterations that
may be required by the simulation ("historical"
data).
Each game participant has conversational access to his
file via a time-sharing program (the "Participant File Proc-
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Simulation
administrator
Figure 11.- Structure of game's software mechanization.
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essor") and is responsible for entering his decisions on his
participant file. The game administrator is responsible for
the contents of the Universe and Simulation files. The simu-
lation program itself reads in the Universe, Simulation, and
Participant files, and produces a number of printouts, as well
as new, modified, copies of the participant files. The new
copies of the files can then be updated or changed by the par-
ticipants and used as inputs in the next game iteration.
The use of separate files for input and output allows the
complete history of a game to be saved for future use. This
use may be the rerunning of the game with improved environment
data (without having to re-enter all the participant's deci-
sion variables) or the use of intermediate stages in a game as
starting conditions for other games (parallel comparison
runs).
Appendix D shows the structure of these data sets, as
well as the data contained in them. Table 1 lists the partic-
ipants' input decision variables. As it can be seen, some of
the participant's inputs (the financial and equipment transac-
tion data) are in the Simulation file, rather than in the
respective participant's file. The reason is that these deci-
sions are subject to "scenario" rules not mechanized in com-
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On the Participant's file:
Flight information:
Flight number
Equipment used
Itinerary
Schedule of departures
For each city pair:
Discrete price (tariff)
Published connections
Tariff-distance formula
On the Simulation file:
Financial transactions:
Initial cash flow
Periodic payments
Length of time
Final cash flow
Aircraft transaction:
Aircraft type
Number of aircraft
Purchase price or lease cost
For a lease: length of time
For a purchase: depreciation data
For a sale: aqe of aircraft sold
Table 1.- Participant's decision variables
I
~ )
puter code (see Section 2.4.3). Thus, the conversational pro-
grams cannot verify the validity of the inputs: the game
administrator must "censor" them (i.e. verify their conformity
with the scenario rules). Thus, they are included in the Sim-
ulation file, which is under the administrator's control.
Also shown in Table 2 are the run parameters that may be
changed by the game administrator without modifying the Uni-
verse File data.
The following example illustrates the use of a conversa-
tional program to access a participant file. Appendix E sum-
marizes the commands available in all three conversational
file access programs.
The FTL mechanization is made up of seven software units
written in PL/I, totalling 8,800 statements (approximately
equivalent to twice as many FORTRAN lines). All the data used
is stored in on-line disc devices. Top-down structured pro-
gramming disciplines were used to keep the proqramming costs
under 2 man-years. Usage costs are illustrated in the follow-
ing examples.
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On universe file:
Airport data:
Identifier
City name
Market identifier
Latitude, Longitude, Time zone
Aircraft type restrictions
Minimum connection time
Market data (for each season):
Market I.D.
Nominal demand
Nominal level-of-service
Nominal tariff
Elasticity w.r.t. price
Elasticity w.r.t. level of service
Aircraft data:
Identifier
Capacity (seats)
Range
Cruise airspeed
Cost per block hour
Cost per operation cycle
Cost per day
Airport restriction code
Particicant data:
I.D. and full name
Cost per passenger enplanes
Cost per revenue pax-mile
Cost per available seat-mile
Cost per dollar of revenue
Minimum interflight gate time
Minimum intersegment gate time
On the Simulation file:
Allocation multiplier ("x")
Connection penalty time
Allocation time deadband
Global demand multiplier
Implicit price deflator
Season to be simulated
Short-term bank deposit rate
Subsidy paid to each participant
Corporate income tax rate
Capital gains tax rate
Investment tax credit rate
At run submission time:
Number of days per simulation period
Iteration termination parameter
("epsilon")
Fraction of demand allocated per
iteration period
Table 2.- Run-time game parameters
4.2 ANNOTATED EXAMPLE
The following example is a single iteration of an
extremely simple case, constructed to demonstrate the mathe-
matical models described in the previous Chapter, and to
illustrate the current mechanization's input and output for-
mats.
4.2.1 Game Scenario
There are only two participants in this simple case, with
the identifiers "ZY" and "ZZ"; there are three market regions:
Boston, Hyannis and Nantucket, with one airport each, BOS, HYA
and ACK respectively. Thus, there are three possible market
area pairs: BOS-HYA, BOS-ACK and HYA-ACK. Three types of air-
craft are available to each carrier: CNT, CN4 and PAN (Cessna
Titan, Cessna 402B, and Piper Navajo, respectively), with
fluctuating market prices.
Figure 12 shows a printout of the Universe file data.
Although real geographical names and locations are used for
the airports in this example, the market data is completely
artificial, with the numerical values selected to demonstrate
the operation of the demand allocation mechanism.
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LAST MODIFIED 78/07/11 09:56:00.56 PAGE 1
MARKET
PAIR
DAILY NOM DEMAND
2 3 41 1
ACK-BOS 10 15 20 1510.00
ACK-HYA 7 11 15 00.00
BOS-ACK 10 15 20 1510.00
BOS-HYA 10 15 20 1510.00
HYA-ACK 7 11 15 010.00
HYA-BOS 10 15 20 1510.00
NOMINAL FARE NCMTNAL L.O.S. FARE ELASTICITY L.O.S. ELASTICITY
2 3 411 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
0.00 0.00 0.0010.250 0.250 0.250 0.2501-0.90 -1.20 -1.40 -1.001 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
0.00 0.00 0.0010.250 0.250 0.250 0.2501-0.90 -2.00 -2.00 -1.001 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
0.00 0.00 0.0010.250 0.50 0.250 0.2301-0.90 -1.20 -1.40 -1.001 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
0.00 0.00 0.0010.300 0.300 0.300 0.3001-1.00 -1.80 -2.00 -1.001 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
0.00 0.00 0.0010.250 0.250 0.250 0.250l-0.90 -2.00 -2.00 -1.001 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
0.00 0.00 0.0010.300 0.300 0.300 0.3001-1.00 -1.80 -2.00 -1.001 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
ID CITY NAME
MARKET LATITUDE LONGITUDE TIME
SERVED DD:MM:SS DD:MMI:SS ZONE
CONN BASIC BASIC COST/ REST
TIME TIME CCST SEAT CODE
ACK NANTUCKET MA ACK 41:25:22 70:03:33 1 2 3 5 0.00 0
BOS BOSTON MA SOS 42:21:52 71:00:17 1 15 10 5 0.25 0
HYA HYANNIS MA HYA 41:39:55 70:16:48 1 2 4 5 0.00 0
MARKET LATITUDE
ID CITY NAME SERVED CD:MM:SS
BOS BOSTON MA SOS 42:21:52
HYA HYANNIS MA HYA 41:39:55
ACK NANTUCKET MA ACK 41:25:22
PARTICIPANT
ID
ZY
ZZ
PARTICIPANT
FULL NAME
MASSACHUSETTS AIRLINES
TECH AIRWAYS, INC.
LONGITUDE TIME CONN DASIC BASIC COST/ REST
DD:1M:SS ZONE TIME TIME CCST SEAT CODE
71:00:17 1 15 10 5 0.25 0
70:16:43 1 2 4 5 0.00 0
70:03:33 1 2 3 5 0.00 0
MIN STOP
TIME
MIN INTERFLIGHT COST PER:
TIME ASM RPM ENP $REV
2 0.01 0.00 1.25 0.07
2 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.07
TYPE SEATS RANGE SPEED 0OC/H DOC/0
CNT 9 800 183 85 5
CN4 6 488 187 70 5
PAN 8 800 183 78 5
Figure 12.- Universe file listing for annotated example
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The simulation is started from scratch, rather than
assuming that the carriers had been operating previously
("going concern"). Each participant is initially allocated
$500,000, in the form of $500,000 of initial paid-in capital
for ZY, and $250,000 of capital and $250,000 of straight debt
for ZZ. Carrier ZY decides to purchase one CN4, at $250,000,
while ZZ purchases one PAN at the same price. Thus, both car-
riers begin the first period of simulation with $250,000 of
cash on hand each. Complete freedom of routing and fare-set-
ting is assumed.
The implicit price deflator is set to 1.0 (no inflation),
the allocation deadband is set at 15 minutes (all entries
within 15 mins. of the minimum-time entry will be treated
equally). The allocation time and price elasticities have been
set equal to the level of service and price elasticities used
for the market's total demand. The x multiplier, which deter-
mines the shape of the desirability vs. time curve has been
arbitrarily set to four*. The short-term deposit interest rate
is 5%.
* There is no empirical data from which the value of 4 can be
rationalized; however, it is close to the values used in
analogous models (Reference 11).
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Comments
user zy 0 1
ENTER USER ID:
zy
USER: ZY MASSACHUSETTS AIRLINES
ZY>
mt
MINIMUM INTERFLIGPT TIME(MINS): 2.0
ZY>
af 1
ENTER EQUPMENT TYPE:
cn4
ENTER ITINERARY:
bos hya ack
ENTER SCHEDULE:
8:00
AVAILABLE AT 8:46
ZY>
af 2
ENTER EQUIPMENT TYPE:
cn4
The user invokes the participant
file processor. File 0 is the input
file, file 1 the output.
The system checks the user's i.d.
O.K.
This is the "system ready" prompt.
The user asks what the minimum inter-
flight time is.
Add flight nuber 1.
The user has entered the first
departure time only. The processor
will compute the block times,
minimum gate times, and departue
times for the rest of the flight.
The system answers with the
earliest time at which that aircraft
is again available.
Same for flight 2.
Figure 13 - Sample interactive session with the
participant file processor (continues).
()
Text
(CommentsText
ENTER ITINERARY:
ack bos
ENTER SCHEDULE:
10:00
AVAILABLE AT 10:37
ZY>
lf 1 2
ZY 1 EQ: CN4
S# FROM TO DEP T ARR T BLK T
1 BOS HYA 8:00 8:30 0:30
2 HYA ACK 8:32 8:44 0:12
ZY 2 EQ: CN4
S# FROM TO DEP T APR T BLK T
1 ACK BOS 10:00 10:35 0:35
ZY>
tc 16 0.16
ZY>
DIST COST
52 51.50
17 29.00
DIST COST
70 57:33
lt bos hya
STANDARD: 23.79 CARRIER: 24.32/
ZY>
mt bos hya 25.00
ZY>
STANDARD: 28.79 CARRIER: 24.32/ 25.00
ZY>
Same procedure as flight 1.
To check his input, the user asks
for a printback of the flight
information. Note the flight cost
printout. Distances are in nautical
miles.
The user sets his fare formula to
$16 plus $0.16 per nautical mile.
Requests the BOS-HYA tariffs.
The user sets a discretionary $25
fare for the bos-hya flights.
The system "remembers" 3OS-HYA.
In the simulation, the discrete ($25)
fare will take precedence overthe
formula ($24.32) fare.
Figure 13 - (continued)
Comments
cs
FLEET REQUIPEMENTS (BY TYPE):
CN4 1
ZY>
save new
SAVED (NEW FILE) AS:
USER: ZY MASSACHUSETTS AIRLINES
FILE: TEST0001 78/07/12 10:43:47.74
STAT: 00000000 78/07/11 10:04:37.38
UNIV: UNIV0001 78/07/11 09:56:00.56
ZY>
end
The user requests a flow check.
Had the flow not been balanced,
the system would have printed out
the naymes of the stations at which
the flow did not balance, and the
amount by which it did not.
Satisfied with his inputs, the user
saves them in the output file. The
system responds by typinq the new
file's name and creation date and
other data.
The user loqs off.
Figure 13 - (concluded).
I
Text
4.2.2 Conversational Data Inout
Figure 13 is a listing of the terminal session used by
carrier ZY to enter his decision variables for the first
period of simulation. Lowercase text is the participant's
typing, uppercase text is the system response. Blank lines
have been added to the conversation to allow space for comment
lines. This session used less than one second of CPU time on
an IBM 370/168 machine operating under the Conversational Mon-
itor Program (CMP) of the Virtual Machine (VM) Operating Sys-
tem. In a more complex game, the segment data provided at the
terminal could be used to construct the schedule, or to make
incremental modifications to an existing one.
Figure 14 shows the schedule of services resulting from
the schedule of flights entered by the two participants. This
printout follows closely the data format of the Official Air-
line Guide, OAG. This is the form in which participants know
each other's schedules, and is made available only after each
participant has entered his schedule, to avoid "back-and-
forth" schedule changes. As it can be seen, Carrier ZZ uses
exclusively the standard ("CAB") formula, while ZY uses his
own formula ($16 plus $0.16 per mile) for every market except
BOS-HYA, where he applies a discretionary $25.00 fare. Of the
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F LIGHT ITINERARIES C
MASSACHUSETTS AIRLINES
CN4 BOS HYA ACK
CN4 ACK BOS
CN4 BOS HYA
CN4 HYA BOS
TECH AIRWAYS, INC.
2 PAN ACK HYA BS
10 PAN BOS ACK
TO BOSTON MA BOS 1
FR HYANNIS MA HYA 1
CAB 28.79
ZY 24.32
10:14 10:44 ZZ 2 PAN 0
17:00 17:30 ZY 4 CN4 0
FR NANTUCKET MA ACK 1
CAB 30.95
ZY 27.20
10:00 10:35 ZY 2 CN4 0
10:00 10:44 ZZ 2 PAN 1
TO HYANNIS MA HYA 1
FR BOSTON MA BOS 1
CAB 28.79
ZY 25.00
8:00 8:30 ZY 1 CN4 0
15:00 15:30 ZY 3 CN4 0
FR NANTUCKET MA ACK 1
CAB 24.60
ZY 18.72
10:00 10:12 ZZ 2 PAN 0
TO NANTUCKET MA ACK 1
FR BOSTON MA BOS 1
CAB 30.95
ZY 27.20
8:00 8:44 ZY 1 CN4 1
8:00 8:35 ZZ 10 PAN 0
FR HYANNIS MA
CAB 24.60
ZY 18.72
8:32 8:44 ZY 1
HYA 1 1
CN4 0 I
Figure 14.- OAG-type printout of flights
offered by participants.
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three region-pair markets, two (BOS-ACK in both directions and
BOS-HYA in the Hyannis to Boston direction) are competitive.
Each carrier has single-segment flights and two-segment
flights.
During the first game period, carrier ZZ decides to sell
its Navajo (at a substantial profit; presumably the scenario
market price for Navajos increased from the original price)
and purchase a Cessna. Also, they add a bank loan to their
debt. These transactions are carried out to illustrate the
financial reports included as part of the "common data" print-
outs.
4.2.3 Analysis of Simulation Results
Figures 15 through 17 show the "debug" printout which can
be invoked by the simulation administrator to print out in
detail the demand determination and allocation process. In
Page 1 of this printout (Figure 15, top), the total demand
determination process is being performed; for each market the
printout shows the ideal Jet Time (in minutes), the nominal,
standard and average fares charged, nominal and actual levels
of service, and the nominal and actual total demand levels.
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MITFTL ATIS FIRST QUARTER
MARKET->ACK-BOS JET TIME: 24
IZY 2 0.6071ZZ 2 0.393
MARKET->BOS-ACK JET TIME: 24
IZY 1 0.6071ZZ 10 0.393
MARKET->ACK-HYA JET TIME: 17
IZZ 2 1.000
MARKET->HYA-ACK JET TIME: 17
IZY 1 1.000
MARKET->BOS-HYA JET TIME: 22
IZY 1 0.4101ZY 3 0.590
MARKET->HYA-BOS JET TIME: 22
IZY 4 0.695|ZZ 2 0.305
FARE:
FARE:
FARE:
FARE:
FARE:
FARE:
30.95(CAB)
30.95(CAB)
24.60(CAB)
24.60(CAB)
28.79(CAB)
28.79(CAB)
30.95(NOM)
30.95(NOM)
24.60(NOM)
24.60(NOM)
28.79(NOM)
28.79(NOM)
LOS:0.250(NOM)
LOS:0.250(NOM)
LOS:0.250(NOM)
LOS:0.250(NOM)
LOS:0.300(NOM)
LOS:0.300(NOM)
Figure 15.- Total demand and initial desirability parameter determination.
28.67(AVR)
28.67(AVR)
24.60(AVR)
18.72(AVR)
25.00(AVR)
25.68(AVR)
0.068(ACT)
0.060(ACT)
0.051(ACT)
0.046(ACT)
0.124(ACT)
0.142(ACT)
DEMAND:
DEMAND:
DEMAND:
DEMAND:
DEMAND:
DEMAND:
10(NOM)
10(NOM)a
7(NOM)
7(NOM)
10(NOM)
10(NOM)
6 (ACT)
6(ACT)
4 (ACT)
5(ACT)
8(ACT)
8(ACT)
U
D E B U G P R I N T 0 U T 78/09/18 12:46:18.82 PAGE I
78/09/18 12:46:18.82
FIRST QUARTER D E B U G P R I N T 0 U T
ALLOCATION ITERATION NO. 1
MARKET->ACK-BOS
MARKET->BOS-ACK
MARKET->ACK-HYA
MARKET->HYA-ACK
MARKET->BOS-HYA
MARKET->HYA-BOS
6.36 1ZY
6.041ZY
3.72 1 ZZ
4.571ZY
8.11lZY
8.32 1ZY
0.77
0.73
0.74
0.91
0.67
1.16
0.771ZZ 2 0.50 0.50
0.731ZZ 10 0.48 0.48
0.74
0.91
0.67|ZY
1.16|ZZ
3 0.96 0.96
2 0.51 0.51
ALLOCATION ITERATION NO.
MARKET->ACK-BOS
MARKET->EOS-ACK
MARKET->ACK-HYA
MARKET->HYA-ACK
MARKET->BOS-HYA
MARKET->HYA-BOS
2.54 ZY
2.42 ZY
1.491 ZZ
1.83 ZY
3.24 1ZY
3.33|ZY
0.77
0.73
0.74
0.85
0.67
1.16
0.771 ZZ
0. 20I zz
0.74
0.16
0.50 ZY
1.16|ZZ
0.50 0.50
0.48 0.48
3 0.96 0.96
2 0.51 0.51
ALLOCATION ITERATION NO.
MARKET->ACK-BOS
MARKET->BOS-ACK
MARKET->ACK-HYA
MARKET->BOS-HYA
MARKET->HYA-BOS
0.451 ZY
1.271ZZ
0.27|ZZ
1.12 1 ZY
0.991ZY
0.45
0.48
0.27
0.96
0.99
0.16 1ZZ
0.48
0.00
0.15
0.00IZZ
2 0.29 0.00
2 0.51 0.25
Figure 16.- Demand allocation process. (iterations 1-6)
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78/09/18 12:46:18.82
FIRST QUARTER DEBUG PR INTOUT
ALLOCATION ITERATION NO. 8
MARKET->BOS-ACK 0:
MARKET->HYA-BOS D:
FLIGHT
FLIGHT
FLIGHT
FLIGHT
LOAD:
LOAD:
LOAD:
LOAD:
0.321ZZ 10 0.32 0.32
0.591ZZ 2 0.51 0.09
BOS
ACK
BOS
HYA
4.90 HYA
4.00 BOS
4.66 HYA
4.92 BOS
FLIGHT 2 LOAD: ACK 5.57 HYA
FLIGHT 10 LOAD: BOS 3.64 ACK
5.31 ACK
OUTPUT FOR PARTICIPANT ZY
OUTPUT FOR PARTICIPANT ZZ
5.02 BOS
Figure 17.- Demand allocation process. (final results)
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Taking the ACK-HYA market for example, we see that the
average fare is the same as the the nominal fare. Thus, the
difference between the nominal and actual demands is due
exclusively to the lower level of service actually offered
(0.051 vs. 0.250). The return market, HYA-ACK, has a slightly
lower level of service (0.046 vs. 0.051). This is due to the
earlier (and thus less convenient) time of day of the single
departure serving this market (8:32 vs. 10:00 for the ACK-HYA
direction). The fare offered, however, is lower ($18.72 vs.
$24.60). This causes (due to the high elasticity of demand
with respect to fare) an increase in actual demand which more
than offsets the reduction due to the lower level of service.
There is always the question as to whether the total
demand in a two-way market should be constructed symmetrical
to begin with, e.g. by averaging the two fares and levels of
service, rather than having, as here, different demands in
each direction. Certainly, the demands are not entirely dis-
joint; a passenger flyinq from A to B is likely to fly back
from B to A. On the other hand, if there are alternate modes
of transportation, then large asymmetries in the fare/level of
service structure may cause a directional diversion of demand
towards other modes. Since we are interested in out-of-the-
ordinary supply conditions (such as asymmetric fares) it was
decided to take the latter approach.
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The two markets that we have been discussing (ACK-HYA and
HYA-ACK) are served by a single entry each. The desirability
of each single entry is, therefore, unity. On the ACK-BOS
market, however, we see two competing entries, ZY 2 and ZZ 2.
Looking back to Figure 14 we see that they both depart at
10:00. ZZ 2, though, is both a one-stop flight, and is the
more expensive of the two entries ($30.95 vs. $27.20). This
is reflected by an initial relative desirability of 0.39 for
this flight, with 0.61 going to the competition. Barring
capacity saturation, this would be the proportion of total
demand allocated to each carrier.
The effect of the time-of-day variation of demand is seen
in the BOS-HYA market, where both entries are ZY's, at the
same fare ($25). The different initial relative desirability
(0.41 vs. 0.59) is entirely due to the difference in departure
times (8:00 vs. 15:00): the latter departure time minimizes
the displacement time for a larger portion of the daily
demand. Similarly, notice the difference in level of service
offered in the HYA-BOS and the ACK-BOS markets. Both have the
same number of departures (2), but the simultaneous departures
in the latter results in a much lower level of service (0.068
vs. 0.142) than in the market with well-spaced departures
(BOS-HYA).
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Fiqure 16 shows the initial iterations (1-6) through the
demand allocation loop. The first number after the market
name indicates the remaining unallocated demand. Thus, the
initial total demand in the ACK-BOS market is 6.36 passen-
gers/day. One-fifth of this (1.27) is allocated during this
pass, 0.77 to ZY 2, and 0.5 to ZZ 2, according to their ini-
tial desirabilities. There is no load limiting process in
effect, and therefore the entire 0.77 demand is "accepted" by
flight ZZ 2 (second 0.77). This process continues for all the
markets, and nothing different happens until the fourth itera-
tion.
In pass number 4, we see that, in the BOS-ACK market, the
allocated demand accepted by flight ZY 1 is 0.2, short of the
0.73 allocated. This is caused by saturation of one of this
flight's segments (both are needed to go from BOS to ACK).
The other flight (ZZ 10) does not benefit from this reduction
until the next pass. The total demand for the market, how-
ever, is reduced only by 0.68, and not by 1.21 as during the
previous passes.
Actually, both segments of ZY 1 seem to be saturated, as
can be seen from the load reduction process taking place in
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that flight's entries in the HYA-ACK and BOS-HYA markets. No
other flight is, for the moment, saturating. During the sixth
pass, we see that ZY 1 has been dropped entirely from further
consideration, its accepted demand having dropped below a cer-
tain minimum during the previous pass. ZZ 2 has also satu-
rated and, as a matter of fact, has not accepted any demand in
either the ACK-BOS or the ACK-HYA markets during this pass; it
will be dropped from further consideration in these markets.
ZY 4 is about to suffer the same fate in the HYA-BOS market.
ZZ 10 appears to be the only flight without signs of satura-
tion. The HYA-ACK market has dissapeared completely, since
its only entry, ZY 1, is saturated.
Now, to Figure 17 for the final (eighth) pass and
results. The market served by ZZ 10 (BOS-ACK) has seen its
demand totally allocated (0.32 remaining, 0.32 accepted by ZZ
10). Thus, this market will be dropped from further consider-
ation. Since the last entry in the HYA-BOS is also about to
saturate, this is the last allocation pass. The total load
carried by each segment of each flight is printed next. The
relative low loading of ZZ 10 is apparent.
The unsatisfied total demand in a market can be deter-
mined from the last allocation printout for that market. For
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instance, in the HYA-BOS market, we see that the last itera-
tion allocated 0.09 pax/day (to flight ZZ 2), of the 0.59
pax/day left, and thus 0.50 pax/day were not carried at all.
This represents 6% of the 8.32 pax/day original demand for
that market. This market is served by both ZY 4 and the sec-
ond segment of ZZ 2. The average load factors for these
flights are 82% and 63% respectively, or a traffic-weiqhted
average of 72%. Looking at Figure 7a we see that a 72% average
load factor corresponds to a 0.77 demand/capacity ratio, which
(Figure 7b) indicates that 0.94 of the total demand is car-
ried. This corresponds quite well with the 6% turn-away ratio
observed in the example.
Figure 18 shows the resulting traffic statistics for this
simulation pass. The "Table X" data follows the C.A.B. format
(10% sample for the period of time involved). These are pas-
sengers actually carried, not the demand computed in Figure
15. The period simulated was one quarter (91.25 days).
While demand was being allocated to each flight, the rev-
enue produced by that demand was also allocated. This revenue
is reflected in the carrier's private detailed printout. The
private printout for carrier ZZ is shown in Figure 19. For
each flight flown by the carrier, the printout shows the reve-
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78/09/18 12:46:18.82
FIRST QUARTER TABLE X STATISTICS
TOTAL:
TOTAL:
TOTAL:
TOTAL:
TOTAL:
TOTAL:
CARRIER 0-0 PASSENGER-MILES
ZY
ZZ
TOTAL:
SYSTEM STATI ST ICS
SYSTEM OPERATING STATISTICS
AVAILABLE SEAT-MILES:
REVENUE PASSENGER-MILES:
TOTAL ENPLANEMENTS:
AVERAGE DAILY EQUIPMENT UTILIZATION:
AVERAGE STAGE LENGTH (MILES):
AVERAGE LOAD FACTOR:
Figure 18.- Traffic statistics printout for annotated example.
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FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
ACK
BOS
ACK
HYA
BOS
HYA
BOS
ACK
HIA
ACK
HYA
BOS
118240
64355
182595
78/0<
269924
182120
3057
1:47
55
0.675
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MITFTL ATIS FILE STATUS: 10000000 P A R T I C I P A N T F I L E P R I N T 0 U T
FILE ID: TEST0001 78/07/11 10:10:13.28 TECH AIRWAYS, INC.
LAST USE: 78/09/18 12:46:18.82
UNIVERSE: UNIV0001 78/07/11 09:5(
FLIGHT 2 EQUIP: PAN
SEGMENT #
1
2
FLIGHT 10 EQUIP: PAN
SEGMENT #
1
REVENUE:
DEPARTS a
ACK 10:00
HYA 10:14
233.98 C
ARRIVES Q
HYA 10:12
BOS 10:44
TOTALS/AVERAGES:
REVENUE:
DEPARTS Z
BOS 8:00
OST/ASM: 0.1805 REV/ASM: 0.4878 REV/RPM: 0.7570 NET INCOME:
DIST TIME COST PAX* ASM RPM L.F.*
20 0:12 30.60 5.6 157 109 69.6
60 0:30 56.00 5.0 479 300 62.7
79 0:42 86.60 5 635 409 64.4
112.71 COST/ASM: 0.1284
ARRIVES Z DIST TIME
ACK 8:35 81 0:35
TOTALS/AVERAGES: 81 0:35
REV/ASM: 0.2316 REV/RPM: 0.5087 NET INCOME:
COST PAX* ASM RPM L.F.*
62.50 3.6 644 293 45.5
62.50 4 644 293 45.5
147.38
50.21
STATION FLOW
STATION: ACK
A 8:35 PAN 10
D 10:00 PAN 2
STATION: BOS
D 8:00 PAN
A 10:44 PAN
10 |
21|
TYPE NET OVN
PAN 0 1
Figure 19.- Carrier private data printout for participant "ZZ".
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MITFTL ATIS FILE STATUS: 10000000 P A R T I C I P A N T F I L E P R I N T 0 U T LAST USE: 78/09/1
FILE ID: TEST0001 78/07/11 10:10:13.28 TECH AIRWAYS, INC. UNIVERSE: UNIVOOC
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ACTIVE
DESCRIPTION TIME FLOW FINAL FLOW
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INITIAL PAID-IN CAPITAL 97 0.00 0.00
EQUIPMENT-SECURED 10-YEAR 10% LOAN 38 6750.00 -250000.00
10% 1-YEAR LOAN 3 2500.00 -100000.00
EQUIPMENT STATUS
TYPE AGE # COST BOOK1 BOK2 LIFEl LIFE2 RESIDV1 RESIDV2
- - - --------------------------------------------------------
CN4 0 1 260000 260000 260000 40 40 26000 26000
AIRCRAFT SUMMARY (BY TYPE)
AV. AV. AV. AV. AV.
TYPE NO AV. NO. REQ. BOOK VAL. AGE USE/DAY STAGE LEN BLOCK SPEED
-- - - -----------------------------------------------------
CN4 1 0 260000.00 0.0 0:00 0 0.0
PAN 0 1 0.00 0.0 1:17 53 124.6
USER PARAMETERS
COST PER ENPLANEMENT 1.2500
COST PER SEAT-MILE: 0.0010'
COST PER PASSENGER MILE: 0.0050
COST PER $ OF REVENUE: 0.0700
MINIMUM STOP TIME: 2.0000
MINIMUM INTERFLIGHT TIME: 2.0000
FARE FORMULA COEFFIENT 1 ($): 0.0000
FARE FORMULA COEFFICIENT 2 ($/NMI) 0.0000
Figure 19.- continued.
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nue collected during the last simulation period, segment-by-
segment direct costs (the Group 1 costs defined in Section
3.6), as well as a "net" income figure (the direct contrib-
ution of that flight to the total overhead and profit).
This printout also includes the flow of flights in and
out of every airport at which flights initiate and terminate,
as well as the number of aircraft (by type) that must "sleep"
overnight at that station. This printout is useful in debug-
ging large flight networks. Note that individual flight seg-
ments (intermediate stops) are not listed.
Next follows a list of the financial transactions active
for the participant, including the number of periods remain-
ing, the periodic cash flow, and the final cash flow implied
by the transaction. Aircraft information is contained in two
listings; the first one shows the number of aircraft owned or
leased by the carrier, grouped by "batches" of identical
length of time in service. Shown are the number and type of
aircraft, length of time in service (or time remaining in
lease for leased aircraft), the cost value (lease paymants for
a lease), and the book value, life, and residual values for
each of the two depreciation schemes carried. The second
listing shows the usage and availability of aircraft by type
as well as their operational statistics.
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Finally, this printout lists the various cost parameters
that are being charged against this participant, some opera-
tional time limitations, and the coefficients of the fare for-
mula he is using.
Available to all participants is the financial informa-
tion for each participant, embodied in four listing: a State-
ment of Earnings, a Statement of Changes in Financial Posi-
tion, a Balance Sheet, and a list of operational and financial
ratios. Figure 20 shows all this data for participant ZZ
("Tech Airways, Inc."). The definitions of the financial
terms may be found in Section 3.7.
4.3 FIRST EXPERIMENTAL USAGE AT M.I.T.
The Flight Transportation Laboratory of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology offers a two-week intensive summer
course on the fundamental aspects of air transportation. This
graduate-level course is oriented towards industry and govern-
ment personnel, and comprises sixty hours of formal classes
and team participation in a short game. Use of the qame is
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STATEMENT OF EARNINGS
OPERATING REVENUES:
PASSENGER
OTHER
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUES
OPERATING EXPENSES:
FL'ING EXPENSES
PASSENGER SERVICES
RESEPVATIONS AND SALES
GEHERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NON-OPERATING EXPENSES:
INTEPEST EXPENSE
LEASE COSTS
TOTAL NON-OPERATING EXPENSES
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES AND EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
MINUS: INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
TOTAL TAXES
EARNINGS BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS:
GAINS ON MAJOR DISPOSITION OF
MINUS: CAPITAL GAINS TAX
FLIGHT EQUIPMENT
TOTAL EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
NET EARNINGS
Figure 20.- Common data printout for participant "ZZ"
31635
3125
34760
13605
1382
P 14
101
4688
21991
6750
0
6750
6020
6020
39688
14013
25675
31694
(continues) .
TECH AIRWAYS, INC.
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION
SOURCES OF WORKING CAPITAL
FROM OPERATIONS:
NET AFTER TAX INCOME
ADD: DEPRECIATION EXPENSE
ADD: BOOK VALUE OF AIRCRAFT SOLD
TOTAL FROM OPERATIONS
OTHER SOURCES:
10% 1-YEAR LOAN
F TOTAL FROM OTHER SOURCES
6t)
USES OF WORKING CAPITAL
PURCHASE OF 1 CN4
TOTAL USES OF WORKING CAPITAL
NET CHANGE IN WORKING CAPITAL
Figure 20.- (continued)
31694
4688
245313
281694
100000
100000
381694
260000
260000
121694
381694
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TECH AIRWAYS, INC.
B A L A N C E S H E E T
78/09/18 12:46:18.82
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS:
CASH AND EQUIVALENT
FIXED ASSETS
FLIGHT EQUIPMENT
MINUS: ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION
TOTAL FIXED ASSETS
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
10% 1-YEAR LOAN
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES
OTHER LIABILITIES
EQUIPIENT-SECURED 10-YEAR 10% LOAN
DEFERRED INCOME TAXES
TOTAL OTHER LIABILITIES
EQUITY
Figure 20.- (continued)
371694
260000
0
260000
631694
100000
100000
250000
35S1
253581
278113
631694
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OPERATING STATIST ICS
TOTAL SEAT-MILES:
REVENUE PASSENGER-MILES:
TOTAL ENPLA'EMiENTS:
A\ERAGE DAILY EQUIPMENT UTILIZATION:
AVERAGE STAGE LENGTH (MILES):
AVERAGE LCAD FACTOR:
F I N A N C I A L S T A T I S T I C S
TURNOVERS (P.A.):
DEBT RATIOS:
INCLUDING INTEREST -
RETURN ON CWINER'S EQUITY
RETURN ON SALES
EXCLUDING BEFORE-TAX INTEREST -
RETURN ON ASSETS
RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL
INVESTMENT TURNOVER
ASSET TURNOVER
EQUITY TURNOVER
CURRENT RATIO (C. ASSETS/C. LIABILITIES)
D/E (LONG-TERM DEBT/EQUITY)
D/A (LONG-TERM DEBT/ASSETS)
TIMES INTEREST COVERAGE
Figure 20.- (concluded)
116792
64132
1105
1:17
53
0.549
RETURNS (P.A.):
45.6%
100.2%
22.2%
26.3%
0.238
0.200
0.455
3.717
0.899
0.396
1.892
MITFTL ATIS FIRST QUARTER TECH AIRWAYS, INC.
introduced in the third day, after the participants have been
exposed to some fundamental concepts, particularly in airline
economics. Four and one-half classroom hours are devoted to
introducing and explaining the game, its objective, rules,
scenario, etc. The participants work on their team decisions
after regular class hours.
During the 1978 session, there were a total of 32 partic-
ipants from U.S. and foreign governments, universities, and
businesses, including international air carriers, airframe
manufacturers, and banks. There were no participants from
U.S. air carriers. The participants were divided into nine
teams of three or four members each.
4.3.1 Game Scenario
The scenario represented an eight-airport closed market
area. Three competing airlines were assumed, with complete
freedom of routing, scheduling, and fare-setting. The simu-
lated period of operations was one year, and thus there was no
market seasonality. The market was also stable (no growth
trend). Four types of aircraft were available to the users.
For simplicity, an infinite supply of leases was assumed
(infinite fleet flexibility) and negative cash-on-hand levels
were allowed (no financial requirements). Table 3 summarizes
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Piper
Navajo
Type: Chieftain
DHC
Twin
Otter
Swearinger
Metro II
Fairchild/
Fokker
F227
Identifier:
Seats:
Average airspeed (kts/mh)
Direct Op. Costs:
per block hour:
per takeoff/landing cycle:
per day (inc. lease costs):
Reference price*, $ 300,000 755,000 990,000 1,250,000
* Lease costs are 16% of the reference price per year.
Table 3.- Aircraft characteristics
0
SWMPAN
8
188/216
78
145
FK7DHT
19
165/190
160
348
231/266
180
455
230/265
300
598
the aircraft's assumed characteristics. These characteristics
are indicative of real aircraft data, but have been modified
so that all four aircraft's costs per seat-mile fall roughly
in a straight line when plotted against number of seats*.
This was done in order to illustrate simple fleet planning
methodology and trade-offs.
The three airlines were assumed to have been operating
previously with a disjoint route structure and a fixed fare
formula, as if in a regulated environment. The participants
were given the results of the operations of their carriers in
the previbus year. The initial route structure covered most
of the possible city-pairs, so that the traffic data was a
good indication of market demand. All three airlines were
operating close to the break-even point. Figure 21 shows the
scenario geography (airports), as well as the assumed initial
route maps for the three carriers. Complete routing freedom
was granted, but all aircraft had to be based at a certain
airport (NYC for carrier NY, Boston for carrier BO, Providence
for carrier PV). Participants were explained that the game's
model behaved "in a way similar to the real world" but were
not given detailed data about the model's operations or its
*The DHC Twin Otter is slightly cheaper than the Metro II for
stages under 72.5 miles, slightly more expensive for longer
stages.
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Figure 21.- Game scenario geography and initial route structure for
MIT summer 1978 games.
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parameters, particularly the elasticities. Average price
elasticity over the network ranged from -1.2 to -1.4, while
the elasticity with respect to the level of service (and with
respect to trip time) was.0.4. The behavioral desirability
multiplier (Section 3.4), which determines the rate of decay
of the time-desirability function, was again arbitrarily set
at 4.
Three parallel games were run simultaneously, and thus
there were three BO teams, three NY teams, and three PV teams.
These games, or "leagues", were labelled A, B, and C. The
purpose of this division was both to reduce the size of the
teams without having an unrealistically large number of compe-
titors in the same markets, and to allow parallel comparison
of similarly-based airlines (e.g. NY-A vs. NY-B vs. NY-C).
The average terminal session required to input a team's
decisions was one hour *, and cost approximately 8 seconds of
machine time using an IBM 370/168. The computer simulation
for a typical three-participant game iteration required some 6
seconds of machine time, and produced some 3,500 lines of
printed output. The total cost (nine game iterations) was
approximately 5 minutes of machine time. The cost is expected
* In this exercise, participants did not use the terminal as
an interactive decisions-making aid.
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to be proportional to the product of the number of city-pairs
considered and the number of participants.
The game objective given to the participants was to max-
imize the carriers' after-tax income. The limited time avail-
able restricted the number of game iterations to three.
Although the iterations are labelled "year 1", "year 2", etc.,
they are really decoupled from one another, and could be
interpreted as three decision iterations for the same year of
operations. This decoupling is caused by the static scenario
data and the absence of financial and fleet decisions carrying
over from one year to the next.
The participants were not professional airline planners
and schedulers; therefore, the results cannot be interpreted
as indicative of what real airline managers would produce.
Nevertheless, this case provides a good example of the level
of analysis detail possible using the game, and thus some of
this analysis will be carried out to illustrate the capabili-
ties of the game, with all the conclusions subject to the
above caveat.
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ITotal seat-miles
Total RPM
Total passengers
Oriqinal
56,502,464
26,580,096
284,627
------- First
Leaque A
137,765,232
32,337,184
329,605
iteration results------
League B League C
105,398,768
35,892,960
303,148
113,703,168
35,329,520
420,995
Average Trip miles/pax
Average segment, miles
Av. segmets/pax trip
Total revenue, $
Average ticket, $
Average revenue, /rpm
Total costs, $
Av. cost, /seat-mile
Breakeven load factor
Actual load factor
Ratio (Actual/Breakeven)
System net income, $
Aircraft used:
PAN/DHT/SWM/FK7
Reference price, $
Seat-miles per hour
Efficiency factor*
93.4
63
1.48
7,876,007
27.67
29.6
7,331,536
13.0
0.439
0.470
1.07
544,471
3/3/1/1
5,405,000
31,668
0.209
98.1
71
1.38
9,041,278
27.43
27.5
14,039,011
10.2
0.371
0.235
0.63
(-4,997,733)
4/2/3/2
8,180,000
50,494
0.311
118.4
77
1.54
7,936,134
26.18
22.1
11,837,025
11.2
0.508
0.341
0.67
(-3,900,891)
4/3/2/1
6,695,000
38,540
0.313
83.9
62
1.35
9,735,732
23.12
27.6
14,128,247
12.4
0.450
0.311
0.69
(-4,392,515)
7/3/4/0
8,325,000
43,142
0.301
* see text
Table 4.- Summer 1978 MIT games - system summary,
initial state and first iteration.
4.3.2 System-level Game Analysis
System-wide analysis (i.e. all carriers combined) is car-
ried out by observing a number of aggregate data and ratios.
Table 4 shows the system summary for the three leagues' first
year (iteration period), along with the results from the sup-
posed previous year (initial state). As it can be seen, the
general trend was to increase the level of operations, in an
attempt to increase each one's market share by increasing fre-
quency share. This did not work out well, since the competi-
tive markets became service-saturated. Total demand did
increase by some 35%, due also to price level reductions of 7%
to 25%. A simple regresion analysis, using flight frequency
as a measure of level of service yielded a global demand elas-
ticity with respect to price of -1.4 (surprisingly close to
the average of the values used on each individual market),
while the correlation of demand with flight frequency was
practically zero (consistent with the supply saturation situa-
tion).
The efficiency with which aircraft are used was measured
by means of a "fleet efficiency factor". This factor is the
ratio of the total seat-miles actually flown in a given period
of time, divided by the theoretical capability of the fleet
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(total seat-miles in that same period of time). This theoret-
ical capability is simply the sum, for all aircraft, or each
aircraft's cruising speed times the number of seats, multi-
plied by the number of hours in the period under considera-
tion. For example, a 200-mph, 8-seat aircraft can theoreti-
cally produce 1,600 seat-miles per hour, or 14,016,000
seat-miles per year. This efficiency factor is a measure of
fleet utilization that accounts for the lower productivity of
smaller flight segments (two one-hour segments produce less
seat-miles than a two-hour segment).
The 90% to 144% increase in Seat-miles was accomplished
with a 21% to 60% increase in fleet capacity and an increase
in efficiency factor from 0.21 to around 0.3. The increase in
operations costs produced by this increase in service caused
substantial losses for all participants. Note the reduction
in costs per seat-mile with the number of seat-miles flown,
suggesting an overall economy of scale.
After the first year results, participants became much
more cautious. Table 5 shows the system results for the sec-
ond game iteration. As it could be predicted from the serv-
ice-saturated situation of the previous year, the system with
the lowest level of operations was the most (the only!) prof-
153
------ Second
League A
87,277,952
32,802,384
339,972
Total seat-miles
Total RPM
Total passengers
iteration results------
League B League C
50,951,504
20,513,184
265,980
76,988,512
33,772,848
368,638
Average Trip miles/pax
Average segment, miles
Av. segmets/pax trip
Total revenue, $
Average ticket, $
Average revenue, /rpm
Total costs, $
Av. cost, /seat-mile
96.5
63
1.53
9,128,926
26.85
27.8
10,403,199
11.9
77.1
65
1.19
7,318,482
27.52
35.7
6,824,396
13.4
91.6
64
1.43
9,163,318
24.85
27.1
10,391,027
13.5
Breakeven load factor
Actual load factor
Ratio (Actual/Breakeven)
System net income, $
Aircraft used:
PAN/DHT/SWM/FK7
Reference price, $
Seat-miles per hour
Efficiency factor
(-1,302,273)
7/0/2/1
4,080,000
22,204
0.449
494,086 (-1,227,709)
7/0/0/1
3,350,000
22,696
0.256
7/2/2/0
5,590,000
29,424
0.299
Table 5.- Summer 1978 MIT games - system summary,
second iteration.
0.429
0.376
0.63
0.375
0.403
0.67
0.497
0.439
0.69
itable one. The results for the third and last iteration
(Table 6) are interesting: the League B participants, spurred
perhaps by the previous positive results, again fell into the
"frequency war" trap, and their profitability tumbled again,
while those of Leagues A and C continued the trend towards
reduced operations with increased fleet utilization. The
final results of game C are particularly noteworthy with a
fleet 55% the size *of the original given fleet (as a matter
of fact, composed exclusively of the smallest aircraft availa-
ble) they carried 127% of the original traffic, almost dou-
bling the net system income obtained under the original market
monopoly scenario, while the average price level (price per
seat-mile) dropped approximately 15%. In the given original
schedule, only one out of 22 markets served was "competitive"
(the second largest carrier must carry more than 10% of the
market). Using the same definition, 10 out of 17 markets were
competitively served during game C's last iteration.
4.3.3 Carrier- and Market-level analysis
Since game "C" produced the best final results (with
respect to the game objective of maximizing the final net
* As measured by the total seat-miles per hour.
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Total seat-miles
Total RPM
Total passengers
------- Third
League A
69,283,600
32,779,504
349,997
iteration results------
League B League C
78,483,264
20,688,336
327,658
50,998,544
33,867,296
344,763
Average Trip miles/pax
Average segment, miles
Av. segmets/pax trip
Total revenue, $
Average ticket, $
Average revenue, /rpm
Total costs, $
Av. cost, /seat-mile
Breakeven load factor
Actual load factor
Ratio (Actual/Breakeven)
System net income, $
Aircraft used:
PAN/DHT/SWM/FK7
Reference price, $
Seat-miles per hour
Efficiency factor
93.7
64
1.46
9,091,105
25.97
27.7
9,176,709
13.2
0.510
0.473
0.93
(-85,604)
6/0/3/0
4,770,000
25,530
0.310
93.7
65
1.44
8,629,361
26.34
28.1
9,987,937
12.7
98.2
77
1.28
8,576,600
24.88
25.3
7,598,295
14.9
0.483
0.391
0.81
(-1,358,576)
8/3/1/0
5,655,000
22,696
0.302
0.588
0.664
1.13
978,305
10/0/0/0
3,000,000
17,280
0.337
Table 6.- Summer 1978 MIT games - system summary,
third iteration.
I'
income), we will analyze the peformance of the participants in
this game. Table 7 shows the evolution of the traffic carried
in the nine largest city-pair markets in the game. These nine
markets account for 75% of the activity in the entire game.
The first column of Table 7 shows the "nominal" bi-directional
daily demand on each market (see Section 3.2 for a description
of the demand model). The actual demand is affected by the
price level, the level of service, and, in one case, capacity
limitations. With the elasticities used (around -1.4 for
price, 0.4 for level of service), management decisions signif-
icantly affected the total demand.
The evolution of prices is shown in Table 8. As it can
be seen, participant PV's prices are consistently below those
of its competitors. Notice how, after the initial surge,
prices do not fluctuate very much, and can be considered sta-
ble by the third and last iteration. The level of services
offered in each market can be measured by the level of service
index (see Section 3.2). Table 9 shows the level of service
indices for the key markets; it must be remembered that the
level of service is extremely non-linear with respect to the
frequencies offered and, futhermore, it is affected by the
time-of-day spacing of the schedules. To illustrate the cor-
relation between this index and the schedule, Figure 22 shows
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Nominal Oriqinal
BOS-HYA
ACK-BOS
BOS-MVY
ACK-NYC
ACK-HYA
MVY-NYC
BOS-PVD
HYA-MVY
EWB-NYC
130
130
88
64
60
48
86.4*
134.4
88.7
68.8
60.7
50.1
76.4
47.3
54.4'
210.1
194.3
121.0
71.8
130.1
52.7
94.7
109.0
55.9
202.3
174.5
120.8
74.8
100.3
54.5
89.0
74.2
57.9
191.7
156.8
120.8
72.1
92.0
54.4
70.9
59.6
56.7
saturation resulted in a substantial fraction of demand unsatisfied.
Table 7.- Average trafic (pax/day) in game "C"'s nine largest markets.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Co 8
9
* Capacity
Market 1 2 3
1BO NY Pv
2
BO NY Pv
3
BO NY
25.24 23.74
30.00 26.86
28.00 24.70
38.50
22.12 20.62
35.62
25.00 22.54
18.00 20.14
34.54
17.00
20.00
18.00
11.00
11.00
11.00
22.00 22.99
28.00 25.98
26.00 23.91
37.14
18.00 19.99
34.88
24.00 21.83
18.00 19.53
33.34
20.00
25.00
22.00
18.00
20.00
18.00
22.00 23.60
28.00 26.91
25.00 24.62
38.00 39.22
18.00 20.30
38.00 39.22
22.33
18.00 19.79
35.03
All prices in dollars
Table 8.- Prices offered in the 9 largest markets during qame"C".
Market Orig.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ul 7
8
9
Pv
BOS-HYA
ACK-BOS
BOS-MVY
ACK-NYC
ACK-HYA
MVY-NYC
BOS-PVD
HYA-MVY
EWB-NYC
28.79
30.95
29.75
43.64
24.60
40.65
27.59
25.20
39.57
20.00
25.00
22.00
18.00
20.00
18.00
Original 1
0.290
0.272
0.256
0.300
0.312
0.280
0.355
0.288
0.279
0.487
0.425
0.505
0.292
0.563
0.285
0.473
0.563
0.270
0.474
0.413
0.410
0.286
0.531
0.285
0.359
0.500
0.270
0.439
0.385
0.420
0.310
0.503
0.329
0.208
0.390
0.290
Table 9.- Levels of service offered on 9 largest markets
during game "C".
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
BOS-HYA
ACK-BOS
BOS-MVY
ACK-NYC
ACK-HYA
MVY-NYC
BOS-PVD
HYA-MVY
EWB-NYC
2 3
L.O.S. = 0.208 L.O.S. =
TO BOSTON MA BOS 1
FR PROVIDENCE RI PVD 1
CAB 24.04
BO 24.00
NY 22.33
PV 20.00
5:57 6:25 PV 20 PAN 0
6:27 6:55 PV 01 PAN 0
7:27 7:55 PV 40 PAN 0
9:00 9:28 NY 302 PAN 0
13:57 14:25 PV 44 PAN 0
14:30 14:58 NY 304 PAN 0
20:00 20:28 NY 306 PAN 0
TO PROVIDENCE RI PVD 1
FR BOSTON MA
CAB
BO
NY
PV
8:14 8:42
12:10 12:38
13:44 14:12
19:14 19:42
22:00 22:28
23:00 23:28
23:08 23:36
24.04
24.00
22.33
20.00
NY 301
PV 43
NY 303
NY 305
PV 33
PV 51
PV 14
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
TO HYANNIS MA
FR NANTUCKET MA
7:05
7:18
8:07
8:30
8:45
8:50
9:40
10:25
10:50
12:00
12:05
12:30
13:07
13:10
13:45
14:20
15:25
15:30
16:10
16:40
17:05
17:50
18:07
18:55
19:00
19:50
20:10
22:30
BOS 1
N 01
N 01
N 01
N 0 |
N 01
N 01
N 01
CAB
NY
PV
7:20
7:34
9:12
8:46
9:00
9:03
9:56
10:40
11:06
12:16
12:20
12:43
14:12
13:26
14:00
14:36
15:40
15:46
16:23
16:56
17:20
18:06
19:12
19:10
19:16
20:03
20:26
22:46
22.12
20.62
11.00
BO 302
PV 20
NY 401
PV 02
BO 304
NY 102
PV 22
BO 306
PV 04
PV 24
BO 308
NY 104
NY 403
PV 06
BO 310
PV 26
BO 312
PV 08
NY 106
PV 28
BO 314
PV 10
NY 405
BO 316
PV 30
NY 108
PV 12
PV 14
PA
DH
SW
DH
PA
SW
DH
PA
DH
DH
PA
SW
DH
PA
DH
PA
S
DH
P
DH-
CI
P
D
S
DH
D
HYA 1
ACK 1 |
N 0
T 0
T 0
N 0 I
T 0 I
T 0 |
N 0 I
T 0 I
T 0 I
N 0|
m 0 I
m? 1 I
T 0 I
N 0 '
T 0 I
~N 0I
T 0 |
m 0 I
T 0 I
N 0 I
T 0 I
4m 1 I
WM 0 |
1T 0 I
AM 0 I
T 0 I
iT 0 I
TO NANTUCKET MA
FR HYANNIS MA
6:35
7:58
8:15
8:20
9:08
9:30
9:55
10:18
11:28
11:35
12:00
12:38
13:15
13:48
14:30
14:55
14:58
15:40
16:08
16:35
17:18
18:25
18:28
19:20
19:30
19:38
20:05
20:48
21:58
CAB 22.12
NY 20.62
PV 11.00
6:50 BO 301
8:14 PV 01
8:30 BO 303
8:33 NY 101
9:24 PV 21
10:35 NY 402
10:10 BO 305
10:34 PV 03
11:44 PV 23
11:50 BO 307
12:13 NY 103
12:54 PV 05
13:30 BO 309
14:04 PV 25
15:35 NY 404
15:10 BO 311
15:14 PV 07
15:53 NY 105
16:24 PV 27
16:50 BO 313
17:34 PV 09
18:40 BO 315
18:44 PV 29
19:33 NY 107
20:35 NY 406
19:54 PV 11
20:20 BO 317
21:04 PV 31
22:14 PV 13
Figure 22.- Schedules corresponding to the lowest and highest values
of the level of service index.
0.563
0~~
H
ACK 1
HYA 1
N 01
T 0
N 0
m 0
T 0
m 1 1
N 0
T 0
T 0
N 0
M 0
T 0
N 0
T 0
M 1
N 0
T 0
M 0
T 0
N 0
T 0
N 0
T 0
M 0
M 11
T 0
N 0
T 0
T 0 |
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DH
PA
S
DH
SW
PA
DH
DH
PA
SI.
DH
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DH
SW
PA
DH
SW.
DH-
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DH
PA
DH-
SW
SW
DH
PA
DH
DH
the actual schedules of the markets with the lowest (BOS-PVD
during iteration 3) and highest (ACK-HYA during iteration 1)
levels of service. Notice, in Table 9, the service improve-
ment in the ACK-NYC and MVY-NYC markets during the last itera-
tion, when participant BO enters the markets, and the reduc-
tion in the BOS-PVD market when BO leaves it.
The general trend i-s to increase the level of service in
the largest markets, and reduce it in the smaller ones (in the
initial state, all major markets were quite uniformly served).
This can be seen by plotting (Figure 23) the data of Table 9.
In spite of numerous "discrete" events, such as participant BO
abandoning market BOS-PVD during the last iteration, or the
network-induced level of service increase in the ACK-HYA mar-
ket*, the trend lines do indicate a settling towards a
decreasing level of service with market decreasing importance.
Table 10 shows the evolution of the market shares; as
mentioned before, the initial state was essentially monopolis-
tic. Three markets continue to be monopolistic until the last
iteration. Carrier PV's market share advantage is clear; how-
ever, its market share never exceeds 63% (nor, during the last
iteration, is less than 43%). Thus, this carrier's outstand-
* This is due to the serving of the ACK-BOS markets via one-
stop flights stopping at 'YA.
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Original
a = 0,0268
R = 0.2923
0.5 -
0.4 -
0.3 -
0.2 -
0.1 -
Year 2
a = 0.0926
R = -0.3059
a = 0.1114
R = -0.2027
0
12 3 4 i I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 89
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.5
0.4
0.3 -
0.2 -
0.1 -
0 0
0 S
S
a = 0.0838
R = -0.5065
1 234 6 7 8 9
Figure 23.- Variation of level of service index on game "C"'s
nine largest markets.
0 * S *
S
1 2 3 4 5;6 7 89
Year 3
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2 -
0.1 -
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year 1
Market
BOS-HYA
ACK-BOS
BOS-MVY
ACK-NYC
ACK-HYA
MVY-NYC
BOS-PVD
HYA-MVY
EWB-NYC
Average*
Original
BO NY PV
0 0 100
100 0 0
100 0 0
0 100 0
0 0 100
0 100 0
50.2 0 49.8
0 0 100
0 100 0
87 100 86
1
BO NY
35.8
28.9
64.8
0
21.6
0
38.8
28.0
0
9.0
19.0
13.4
100.0
18.5
100.0
11.5
11.3
100.0
35.3 28.8
2
PV BO NY
55.2
52.1
21.9
0
59.9
0
49.6
60.6
0
50.6
40.0
40.1
41.0
0
34.0
0
27.4
38.4
0
8.1
22.5
17.5
100.0
23.5
100.0
19.9
17.2
100.0
3
PV BO NY
51.9
37.1
41.5
0
42.5
0
52.8
44.4
0
38.2
14.6
34.6
11.3
10.4
11.8
0
23.2
0
37.8 33.5 45.0 23.5 39.2 51.5
* Traffic-weighted average, markets served only.
Table 10.- Market shares in the 9 largest markets during game "C"
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
PV
49.7
51.5
45.2
0
60.5
0
62.9
43.1
0
12.1
33.9
20.2
88.8
29.1
88.2
37.1
33.8
10.0
Total seat-miles
Revenue Pax-miles
Total revenue, $
Av. rev. /seat-mile
Total costs, $
Av. cost, /seat-mile
Breakeven load factor
Actual load factor
Oriqinal
17,342,320
27,141,488
12,018,640
6,867,735
13,689,638
6,022,746
2,576,976
2,680,872
2,618,159
BO
NY
PV
BO
NY
PV
37.5
19.6
43.5
2,552,360
2,612,585
2,444,322
14.7
9.6
20.3
0.392
0.490
0.467
0.396
0.504
0.501
33,898,208
55,747,520
24,057,440
7,018,817
18,769,824
9,540,893
2,956,561
4,006,770
2,772,401
42.1
21.3
29.1
4,630,846
5,713,008
3,784,393
13.7
10.3
15.8
0.324
0.481
0.541
0.207
0.337
0.397
2
15,581,212
39,110,976
22,296,320
6,395,001
19,367,360
8,010,500
2,466,039
4,070,115
2,627,164
3
9,813,878
29,381,136
11,803,541
7,346,522
18,128,880
8,391,914
1,576,262
4,234,413
2,765,925
38.6
21.0
32.8
2,522,734
4,476,847
3,391,451
16.2
11.4
15.1
0.420
0.545
0.464
0.410
0.495
0.359
21.5
23.4
33.0
1,529,393
4,065,575
2,502,264
15.6
13.8
21.2
0.725
0.592
0.643
0.749
0.617
0.711
Net income, $
24,616
68,287
173,837
(-1,674,285)
(-1,706,238)
(-1,011,922)
(-56,695)
(-406,732)
(-764,287)
analysis - revenues and.costs.
4
46,869
168,838
263,661
Table ll.- Game "C" system
2Total enplanements
Average miles/pax
Av. segment, miles
Av. segments/pax
A/C used
(PAN/DHT/SWM/FK7)
Reference cost, $
95,466
75,077
114,085
71.9
182.3
52.8
105
1.09
. 1.73
1.08
0/3/0/0
0/0/1/1
3/0/0/0
2,265,000
2,240,000
900,000
114,124
130,557
176,314
61.5
143.8
54.1
105,162
137,899
125,576
64,652
142,669
137,441
60.8
140.4
63.8
113.6
127.1
61.1
105
1.06
1.50
1.35
5/0/0/0
0/0/4/0
2/2/0/0
1,500,000
3,960,000
2,110,000
1.09
1.46
1.45
4/0/0/0
2/0/2/0
2/3/0/0
1 , 200 , 00'0
2,580,000
2,865,000
1.50
1.21
1.33
2/0/0/0
5/0/0/0
3/0/0/0
600,000
1,500,000
900,000
10,830 8,640
Capacity, NY 15,654 20,216
(seat-miles/hour) PV 5,184 10,676
BO 0.183 0.448
Efficiency factor NY 0.198 0.315
PV 0.265 0.257
Table 12.- Game "C" analysis - network efficiency
£
6,912
13,564
14,286
0.257
0.329
0.178
3,456
8,640
5,184
0.324
0.388
0.260
l1 3
ing performance is obtained with market shares around 50% in
all major markets served (six out of the nine largest mar-
kets).
Table 11 shows the revenue and cost analysis for the
game; note the high load factors during the last and most suc-
cesful iteration. The apparent economies of scale are such
that the breakeven load factor increases as the level of
activity decreases; thus, the increase in actual load factor
made possible by using smaller aircraft more than offsets the
increased production costs*.
Finally, Table 12 shows the network efficiency analysis
for game "C". As expected, the New York-based carrier has the
highest segment length and passenger trip averages, in spite
of its inroads into the short markets (ACK-BOS, HYA-MVY). The
average number of segments per passenger is a measure of the
non-stop vs. one-stop mix of flights . Carrier NY starts with
a high percentage of one-stop services, while BO continues
with mainly non-stops until the last iteration. Eventually,
the most succesful carriers (NY and PV) settle for an average
* Note that these costs include global activity-related indi-
rect costs as well as aircraft-related direct operating
costs.
** The percentage of non-stop flights is approximately two
minus this index. For example, 1.35 average segments/pax is
equivalent to 65% non-stop and 35% one-stop flights.
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value around 1.4* . This seems to be a reasonable tradeoff
between network efficiency and passenger convenience.
Due to the limited time available, the game participants
did not have the benefit of such a detailed analysis as the
one performed here; rather, they operated on an "incremental"
mode with regards to total level of activity and aircraft to
be used, while, surpirsingly, major schedule revisions were
the rule rather than the exception. It would be interesting
to speculate what the decisions would have been had they had
time and resources to carry out such a detailed analysis. In
particular, would the data of Figure 23 be used to increase
the level of service in the under-served markets at the
expense of the over-served ones, getting even closer to the
trend line?
Some obvious decision mistakes were made, such as NY's
weak dabbling in the Boston-based markets (market shares under
20%), or BO's sudden abandoning the BOS-PVD market, or NY's
use of the smaller aircraft. At the risk of monday-night
quarterbacking, the author could not resist the temptation of
running a test iteration using the benefits of the above anal-
ysis. By altering the NY and BO schedules, while retaining
*The average value for major trunk carriers in also around
1.4.
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the PV schedule, a total system net profit of $1.2 million*
was obtained, with load factors in the high 70's and low 80's,
and a total fleet investment of $3,390,000.
None of these results can be considered as representative
of real-world situations in an absolute sense. However, rela-
tive comparisons and trends can very well indicate the pres-
ence of similar trends in real life. Improved basic data, and
considerable participant decision-preparation effort is
required to obtain results valid in a real situation. The
above example shows the level of detail and the type of analy-
sis that can be carried out with the present mechanization of
the game.
*BO: $429869, NY: $301594, PV: $449432; notice that PV bene-
fited from the other two carrier's changes.
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CHAPTER V
EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
The application of the game to particular problems is not
within the scope of this work. However, this chapter will
review some of applications that were considered durinq the
design of the game, and the nethodologv associated with these
uses. It should not be implied that the game, as it has been
mechanized, can be directly applied to all the cases mentioned
without further work. In most applications, a considerable
data gathering effort is required, while some applications
actually require modifying elements of the game or even
enlarging its scope. Also discussed in this Chapter are a
number of improvements, modifications and extensions which
have been identified during the development of the present
game mechanization. The impact of these improvements range
from "cosmetics" to major structural changes. The implementa-
tion of these improvements, as well as the use of the game for
any of the applications mentioned is left as possible future
work to be done.
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5.1 IMPROVEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS
The range of imorovements and extensions that have been
identified during the development of the game range from minor
modifications to major structural changes. In the minor modi-
fication category, we will only mention, as examples, the
inclusions of a periodic-repayment financial transactions
option (such as a mortgage). The unique characteristic of
this financial transaction is that part of the periodic pay-
ment goes to redeem principal, instead of being entirely
interest. Another minor change would be to model advertising
and "carrier image" passenger preference by the simple expedi-
ent of converting that preference (however obtained) to
"equivalent dollars" or "equivalent time" to be added to that
carriers' service entries.
In the more useful, but also more complex category, we
believe the following items deserve further attention:
a) Develop an "Origin-Destination" data structure associ-
ated with each flight. This structure would allow the speci-
fication of discrete fares for the flight (for passengers from
specified Origin-Destination pairs), as well as the accumula-
tion of O-D actual traffic when the simulation is run. This
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will allow segment data to be compared with that collected in
the real world segment load data collected by the C.A.B.
b) Model the gate occupancy time, with the dual goals of
increasing the schedule's realism, and modeling gate require-
ments (and costs). The present flow-checking and aircraft-
counting algorithm (Section 3.8) can be used for this purpose;
the maximum number of gate positions required at any station
is the maximum value of the flight count for that station. As
opposed to the current algorithm, the flight flow list used
for gate-counting purposes would have to include intermediate
segment stops and would aggreqate all aircraft types.
c) Non-weekly schedules. As proved in Section 2.4.2, sim-
ulation of non-daily frequencies requires the independent mod-
eling of each day of the week. This requires adding an item to
the flight description, and effectively performing all the
schedule checking functions seven times (one for each day of
the week). The simulation itself (demand determination, allo-
cation, etc) would then be executed seven times (with each
day's schedule) and the results aggregated. This assumes that
demand does not "spill over" from day to day. If it is
assumed that demand may shed from one day to another, then an
approach similar to the time-of-day allocation scheme must be
extended to the entire week (in effect, a 168-hour day).
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d) Automatic connection generation. As already men-
tioned, only economic limitations prevented the mechanization
of an automatic connection generator in the current mechaniza-
tion. There are excellent connection generation algorithms
available (Reference 10). Two major problems must be solved:
the pricing of an unpublished connection (one possibility:
the sum of each individual flight's fares) and, in the case of
a reduced-fare connection, the allocation of the revenue
between the two flights. This is particularly troublesome if
only one of the carriers making up the connection publishes
it.
e) "Smart" entry generator. Again, the coding of a more
sophisticated service entry generator (one that would not be
fooled by an itinerary such as ABCBA) is only a matter of pro-
gramming resources. A very simple algorithm would be to check
for multiple entries, and to select only the one with the
shortest flight time.
Other modifications involve a major re-structuring of the
game and its simulation. This may be required for the most
sophisticated uses postulated in the next Section. Some
interesting possibilities are:
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a) Different times for passenger preference, cost
calculation, and utilization accounting purposes. This major
improvement would use three different measures of "flight
time" as opposed to the current single one. The time used for
demand generation and allocation purposes would include items
such as airport access time (which would, by the way, model
airport preferences in a multi-airport area); the utilization
time would be the sum of the block time and the exactly-com-
puted (as opposed to the current fixed) minimum gate time,
while the cost-related time would take into account the dif-
ferent costs of cruising flight, climb, and taxiing.
b) Multiple interacting demands. The reasons for modeling
multiple demand are explained in Section 2.4.1. The diffi-
culty involved in modeling multiple demand depends on the
degree of interaction between the demands. If the demands are
fully non-interacting (e.g. passengers and mail) then separate
demand determination and allocation processes are carried out,
and the main cost is in incorporating market data for both
demands.
If the demands are fully interacting (such as business
and pleasure travellers sharing the same aircraft space), then
a single demand process must allocate both demands simultane-
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ously; each market is turned into two, effectively competing,
markets: market A-B's business passengers compete with market
A-B's pleasure passengers in the same way they compete with
market A-C passengers that use the same flight segments.
Thus, the iterative demand allocation process developed for
this game can be naturally extended to fully-interacting
demand.
The case of partially-interacting demand (e.g. when the
aircraft has a complex passenger-cargo payload tradeoff enve-
lope) cannot be simulated with the present algorithm as expe-
diently as the fully-interacting case. More work is needed in
order to design an interacting-demand allocation process.
c) Multiple-grade supply (e.g. first-class vs. coach
class seats). This case can be handled by the present algor-
ithm in a way similar to the interacting-demand solution. In
this case, each service offering is split into two competing
service entries (such as "Flight 365F" and "Flight 365Y"). A
price-time equivalence of the advantages of a first-class seat
must be included, or else all the demand will be allocated to
the cheaper entry. Even without this correction, this method
would automatically simulate the spilling of coach passengers
to first class when coach space becomes scarce.
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5.2 ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS
The game can be used as a "test bench" for research and
analysis in air transportation in several ways:
a) Testing and Calibration of individual models. As men-
tioned in the introduction, some sophisticated mathematical
models of elements of air transportation operations are used
with simple assumptions about other elements of the system.
An example would be the total demand model used in this game,
which was previously tested (Reference 12) by assuming a sim-
ple statistical correlation between level of service and
demand, and by assuming a single class of demand. Discrepan-
cies between the results obtained from the model and real-
world observations can be attributed either to the model being
tested, or to the simplifying assumptions about the elements
not modeled. Since, in the game approach, there are less sim-
plifying assumptions, it is easier to calibrate the model than
by its "standalone" use. For example, the total demand model
could be calibrated by means of an extended, multiple-demand
version of this game.
b) Testing of other analysis tools. Due to the high
level of detail of the game, it can be used to check the per-
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formance of other analysis tools. For example, most fleet
planning models are based on Linear Programming techniques.
These models do not incorporate effects that are modeled by
the game, such as load factor tailoff and load shedding. The
ease or difficulty with which the tool can be applied, and
comparison of the game results with those expected from the
tool's model by itself is an indication of how the tool would
perform in a real world situation. For example, an intriguinq
possibility would be to pit a schedule generated by a schedule
optimization program against a hand-generated schedule.
c) Scenario evaluation. Effects of a changing regulatory
environment, introduction of new aircraft technology, general
economic conditions, etc can be evaluated by means of the
game. In addition to the accurate environment simulation, the
gaming dimension adds the human decision-makina element which
is a crucial component of some of these scenarios.
d) General research. There are a number of research
activities that can be carried out by experimenting with the
game. For example, the effects of different measures of sup-
ply (flight frequencies, total asm offered, etc.) in the
estimation of market parameters can be compared. The use of
the game for this purpose has the advantage over real world
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observations that the actual model used (e.g. Erikson's level
of service index) are known. From the results of these com-
parisons, some insight may be gained on the merits of differ-
ent models.
5.3 EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS
The traditional use of management games as educational
tools focuses on the aspect of "experience". Games are seen
as providers of vicarious experience that students may not
acquire otherwise. We also see another use for games with
detailed, high-fidelity operations models, such as this one.
In this application, the game is used as an "experiment
bench" to illustrate abstract concepts and/or methods pres-
ented in the classroom, much in the same way physics experi-
ments are carried out in High School. It can be argued that
this falls in the general category of "experience", but the
difference is that there is a premeditated correlation between
the conduct of the game and the structure of the teaching
process; whereas, in traditional academic gaming, participants
are left more or less "on their own", and herein lays the
value of that experience.
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The integration of the game with the academic curriculum
requires stressing the aspect of operations most relevant with
the subject being treated. Two examples are given:
a) Schedule generation and qraph theory. For this
purpose, the computer simulation does not have to
be run (except as an added realism measure). The
preparation of the data base itself (i.e. prepa-
ration of the schedule) exemplifies the problems
and procedures associated with network analysis.
b) Microeconomics and market equilibrium. In this
case, the qame can be reduced to a single compe-
titive market. The performance of simple market
share models (frequency share, S-curve) can be
compared. Revenue and cost results can be com-
pared with the result of various microeconomic
equilibrium solutions.
Ideally, the game should be used in conjunction with a
structured, integrated approach to the teaching of air trans-
portation. Each subject taught uses as examples cases from
the commonly-run game. When enough material has been acquired,
a full-scale game can be run, while more advanced subject mat-
ter is covered in the classroom.
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5.4 AIRLINE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING APPLICATIONS
"Corporate planning" is at the same time an important
subject and a very difficult one to define. Functionally, it
has been described as the combination of the gathering and
evaluation of relevant data ("environment scanning") and the
evaluation and selection of objectives and strategies. Refer-
ence 15 surveys the many different conceptualizations that
planning activity has been subject to, as well as the planning
practices of 13 major U.S. carriers. The resulting overall
picture is one of great disparity, both in the emphasis given
to formal planning activities, and the mechanisms (if any)
used in these activities.
Two major difficulties seem to stand against the study of
planning activities:
a) There is no way of clearly delimiting which mana-
gerial activities should be labelled "planning"
and which should not; there is (or should be) an
overlap between planning and the daily conduct of
business.
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b) The planning activity seems to be so situation-
dependent that it is outright incorrect to
attempt to define universal "formulae" or precise
planning methodology applicable to all possible
situations. The best that has been achieved is
the identification of "frameworks" within which
the planning process may fit (Reference 16).
One such framework that can be used to conceptualize the
general planning process is that of Vancil and Lorange (Refer-
ence 17). This framework is based on two viewpoints of the
planning activity:
a) There are two processes in action during the
planning cycle: adaptation to changes in the
environment, and integration of the planned deci-
sions to produce a coherent single master plan.
b) The planning activity follows a precise path in
the company's hierarchical structure, from the
top corporate management ("portfolio planning"),
to the business-level management ("business plan-
ning") and, finally, to the operational level
("functional planning").
181
In the Vancil and Lorange framework, planning is an
iterative process of identifying strategic options and alter-
natives and a narrowing down of these alternatives to arrive
at a final strategic, business, and operational plan. Adapta-
tion to changes is stressed in the first part of the cycle,
while integration of components into a unified plan is
stressed in the second part.
The same authors recognize the importance of computer
models and tools in the planning process (Reference 18); how-
ever, they stress the role that computer-based models play at
each individual stage of the planning process: macroeconomic
analysis programs* at the top, corporate level, industry-ori-
ented market and microeconomic models for the business level**
and so-called "pro-forma budget" generators (simple trial
accounting programs), and a large number of operations-ori-
ented mathematical models (PERT, Linear Programming, etc.) at
the third level.
Indeed, existing airline-oriented computer models (or,
more properly, computer-based decision-analysis tools) are
designed with explicit purposes in mind, such as Fleet Plan-
* e.g. those of Data Resources Incorporated (DRI), or the
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce.
**e.g. the PIMS program (Strategic Planning Institute, Cam-
bridge Mass.)
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ning (Reference 19), or schedule evaluation (Reference 11).
The game described in this work does not have such a specific
primary application, and its scope and characteristics differ
from those of the above-mentioned programs.
First, the game itself is not a decision-generating pro-
gram, such as Fleet Planning models which, given the proper
data, automaticaly produce an "optimal" schedule of aircraft
acquisitions. The game can be used to generate decisions in a
closed analysis loop with a human decisions-maker (the partic-
ipant). An example of this process was shown in the previous
Chapter, where the analyzed results of the MIT 1978 Summer
Games were used to generate a better set of scheduling deci-
sions than was possible using the raw output from the game.
Second, the game, as opposed to other computer-based
tools, is not oriented towards a specific stage in the overall
planning process; rather, since it attempts to appear to the
participants as a model of an entire airline, its use, ide-
ally, would reauire the exercise of the three levels of plan-
ning mentioned above, from strategy-setting, to fleet plan-
ning, to detailed scheduling, even if some of these individual
aspects may be "turned off" by appropiate scenario rules*.
*For example, in the MIT games described in Section 4.3, the
fleet planning aspect was eliminated by means of the "infi-
nitely flexible leases".
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We will try to visualize how such a game can be incorpo-
rated in the overall planning process by means of two exam-
ples.
5.4.1 Idealized Use Scenario
Let us assume a hypothetical airline whose top management
has been "sold" on the idea of using the game as a planning
tool. We will present an admitedly "rosy" picture of how such
a game could be integrated not just with the formal planning
effort, but actually with the entire decision-making process
within the organization. In this company, there is no sepa-
rate group performing the planning function or running the
simulation (except maybe for a maintenance and clerical coor-
dination group). All departments participate in the game (and
in the planning process as a consequence) in the same role
they play in the real airline.
Figure 24 shows a diagram of how the decision-making lev-
els would interact using the game as a decision-evaluation
tool. Starting from the bottom, we have a number of people
dedicated to the gatherinq, analysis and evaluation of envi-
ronment and internal data. The results of this activity is a
"best estimate" of current data (market parameters, cost
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structure, etc) and the range of variation expected in the
future ("forecasting"). This data, normally used in the day-
to-day decision-making process, is also used in the games run,
including games where the current operational decisions are
used as inputs. Comparison of the results of such games with
the real-world observed results are then used to refine the
"best estimates", in an iterative fashion, labelled in Figure
24 as the "data evaluation" loop.
In a competitive regulatory environment, the competitor's
strategies and policies become part of the environment data.
This data may be estimated by having "enemy teams" play the
competitors' part in the games. It is in this area that feed-
back from the game may prove indispensable in order to arrive,
in an iterative fashion, at an understanding of "what makes
the competition tick".
The top (corporate) decision-making level is responsible
for defining and setting goals and objectives for the company.
In our idealized situation, along with the current goals and
objectives, a (small) number of alternative policies are also
postulated. These alternatives are then "fed" to the next
decision level along with the current official objectives.
This decision level, which we have labelled "business" level,
186
is responsible for transforming the corporate goals into
actual long-range resource (aircraft, money, etc.) acquisition
plans. Its primary respopsibility is to produce plans that
will reflect the current company goals, but it would also
spend some time producing plans corresponding to the "trial
goals" that the corporate level wishes to evaluate. Thus, the
output from this level of decision-making would be made up of:
a) The current ("best?") long-range fleet and other
resources acquisition plan, according to the com-
pany's current goals.
b) A number of "trial" plans to be evaluated; some
are alternatives to the current long-range plan
in response to the current corporate goals, that
the business level wishes to evaluate, while the
rest are responses to the trial goals and objec-
tives that corporate management wishes to evalu-
ate.
Similarly, the operational decision level, responsible
for the actual scheduling, receives, along with the current
fleet level and predictions based on the current long-range
plan, a number of hypothetical fleets, marketing directives,
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cash flows, etc corresponding to all the "trial" plans.
Again, the main responsibility of this organizational level is
to the "current" plan and the "current" schedule, but it would
also produce schedules in response to the trial decisions of
the previous management level. From the description of the
process so far, it would seem that the multiplicity of differ-
ent strategies, plans, schedules, etc. to be evaluated is
such, that more activity would be spent on managing the game
than on managing the real airline. This need not be so.
First, the level of detail and verification required by
the current schedule (or long-range plan, or objective) is not
necessary for the "trial" decisions. For example, the legal
department does not have to approve the wording of the lease
contracts of the simulated games. Second, the range of trial
decisions produced in response to the previous level's trial
decisions need not be as comprehensive as those produced in
response to the current decisions; for example, five alterna-
tive schedules may be evaluated in response to the current
marketing plan, but only one may be produced in order to eval-
uate alternative market decisions.
Eventually, multiple games are run, corresponding to each
alternate schedule, plan, and objective to be evaluated, and
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the results fed back to the appropiate decision-making level,
resulting in the three planning loops identified in Figure 24.
Both the generation of options and the selection of alterna-
tives to form the "current" plan would use, among other
inputs, the results of the games generated and run with this
framework.
Admittedly, this process is expensive, and even with the
simplifications mentioned above, a considerable amount of
effort is spent in generating decisions that will never be
implemented*. But this approach has a number of benefits:
The process is capable of spotting "methodological", as well
as substantive, problems. For example, a certain long-range
plan (such as the one postulated in the following Section) may
impose such scheduling constraints that the scheduling process
currently used by the airline is incapable of producing an
acceptable schedule. Therefore, the develooment of an alter-
native scheduling process must be added to the costs (or bene-
fits!) of that long-term plan. Thus, the game usage framework
proposed would yield valuable information even without running
the game.
*A significant reduction in clerical overhead could be
achieved by integrating the game's data bases with the com-
pany's Management Information System. For example, if a
game trial schedule is selected as the next schedule, it can
be automatically converted to the format required.
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Also, the game acts as a "backbone" for the entire
planning process. Although the results of the qames are the
main reason for running them, the mere fact that so many
departments within the airline are simultaneously considering
both the actual and hypothetical decisions is a way of carry-
ing a formal planning activity without the tedious forms to
fill and boring planning meetings to attend that have charac-
terized other formalized planning systems. And, since each
decision-making level receives a tangible result from its gam-
ing efforts (the results of their own decision alternatives),
nobody feels that he is wasting his time just to please his
bosses' whim.
Finally, the integration process mentioned by Vancil and
Lorange is automatically carried out, since the games cannot
be run until all the operational components are present. And
since the generality of the game is such that a significant
range of out-of-the-ordinary situations (both environmental
and managerial) can be simulated, the adaptation process is
strengthened by allowing exploration of alternatives that
often are dismissed because "its effects are impossible to
analyze".
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5.4.2 A Specific Planning Application: Dual Objectives
The operations of bulk shipping companies (e.g. oil
tanker lines) have traditionally been influenced by the large
swings in the market prices of equipment (shipping tonnage)
caused by periodic surges and depressions in the world ship-
ping requirements. Income (or loss) derived from speculating
with the equipment market prices is some times comparable to
the income and costs of operating that equipment, and this
fact is reflected in the way bulk shipping companies are man-
aged (Reference 20).
It has been suggested that airlines may benefit from a
form of this dual corporate strategy: to combine revenue-prod-
ucing operations with the potential oportunity for revenue
from speculating with aircraft prices. This would involve the
use of sub-optimal fleets (too large when aircraft are bought
at low prices, too small when they are sold at a profit), and
the flying operations and schedules would have to be tailored
to the available fleet. Simultaneously, the amount of air-
craft that can be purchased and sold for profit would be lim-
ited by the need to fly an acceptably profitable schedule.
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Arguments exist to the effect that the airline industry's
and the shipping industry's operating conditions are so dis-
similar that it is impossible for airlines to carry out this
dual business goal (particularly since air carrier operational
revenues have historically been marginal even with optimized
fleets). On the other hand, current trends in deregulation
(which may change the operating environment, such as free
entry and exit from markets), and the even more current surge
in aircraft prices indicate that such a proposal may not be
dismissed lightly.
In order to evaluate this concept, it is necessary to
analyze the effects of both activities (speculation and flight
operations) simultaneously. The level of detail of the game
developed in this work is sufficient to carry out a feasibil-
ity analysis on this proposal. Such analysis is beyond the
scope of this work, but we will outline the methodology with
which it could be carried out.
First, a "grid" of scenario assumptions must be postu-
lated. This grid consists of combination of aircraft market
Drice variation assumotions with market demand assumptions*.
* Obviously, the two are not independent: low aircraft market
prices are usually caused by a reduction in demand for air
travel.
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Next, a set of operating tactics are developed to maximize the
existing fleet's profitablilty in spite of its suboptimal size
and/or composition. Some of the tradeoffs to be explored
include whether to "mothball" surplus aircraft vs. utilizing
them by "packing" the schedules around the prime day-time
hours, or whether, faced with a reduction in fleet size, to
pull out completely from some markets vs. a reduction of level
of service across all markets.
The evaluation of the game's results should incorporate
the determination of the "ootimumr" balance between the specu-
lative aspect and the operating aspect. The two extremes
would be the current airlines' operating mode (little or no
emphasis on planned speculation) at one end, and a simple air-
craft "trading post" (no flying operations altogether) at the
other.
It is interesting to note that whereas the previous exam-
ple (use of the game as an integrated decision-evaluation
tool) required that the game operating models achieve a sub-
stantial degree of quantitative accuracy in their results,
this dual-goal evaluation application relies more on compara-
tive results than on absolute results (e.g. if a suboptimal
fleet schedule proves to be ruinous no matter what the market
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parameters are, this is an indication that this policy is
likely to be ruinous with the real market data, i.e. real-
world operations).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The goal of this work was to design a high-fidelity game
for passenger airlines that could be used to carry out experi-
ments that could not be performed on a real airline. It is
first concluded that the minimum level of detail required for
this pupose is the schedule level, since this is the lowest
level of detail at which exact aircraft requirements (and thus
financial requirements) can be determined.
The next conclusion is that existing demand and cost mod-
els seem to be usable for the degree of fidelity sought, while
existing demand allocation models are not. In particular, the
models reviewed were subject to "funny" results (obviously
incorrect results to particular combinations of input data).
The effect of these "funny results" is that, upon discovering
them, participants are tempted to increase their scores by
selecting those Darticular inputs, even though they would not
make any sense in the real-world case.
The demand allocation model developed to satisfy the
requirements of the game seems to be free of extraneous
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results over the game's entire range of operating conditions,
including those that could not be handled by the existing mod-
els. However, scarceness of empirical data on the operation
of airlines under these extreme conditions (e.g. 90% average
load factors) makes testing of this model (other than by "com-
mon sense" observations) a difficult task indeed.
The combination of this demand allocation model with a
state-of-art total demand model and simple cost and revenue
models produces a simulation of airline operations of broader
scope and higher level of detail than has been achieved in
previous efforts.
The game has been shown to be a useful training device;
students in the 1978 MIT summer session special seminar on Air
Transportation that participated in a brief, limited game,
responded positively to the use of the game as a teaching
tool. Only one out of 32 participants was of the opinion that
use of the game was not relevant to the course. Indeed, a
majority indicated that they wished that the game had been
started earlier, and that more time be devoted to the game *
They also expressed a preference for individual, rather than
group, participation in the game. A total of nine game itera-
* In spite of having to work on the game decisions on their
free time.
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tions were carried out, and the only "funny" results observed
was a tendency by the part of the participants to "pack" their
schedules around the fixed, common minimum gate time.
The post-game analysis performed by the author on the
results of the game showed that the data produced by the game
is of a level of detail and realism sufficient to perform than
same type of analysis that would be carried out on data from
real airline operations. Thus, subject to validation of the
quantitative accuracy of the models used, the game seems to
meet the objectives for which it has been designed.
There is a considerable amount of work that can be done
in this area. The most urgent is to verify the accuracy of
the demand allocation scheme used by comparison with real-
world data. The best way of performing this checking is by
implementing the "Origin-Destination" data structure mentioned
in Section 5.1, and comparing the segment data thus obtained
with C.A.B. segment-load data. The large amount of data
involved in such checking will require careful selection of
the test cases (e.g. simple multi-stop terminal routes where
the Origin-Destination passenger load on each segment can be
rationalized).
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The traditionally fixed price structure under which the
industry has been operating made the determination of price
elasticities difficult to determine by traditional time-series
and cross-sectional statistical analysis. Use of the game to
estimate, by a trial-and-error process, some of these parame-
ters (e.g by simulating the recent "super-discount" fare expe-
riments that some airlines have been conducting recently)
should be explored: in this approach, the real-world situa-
tion is replicated in the game, and the game's price and level
of service elasticities modified until the results match the
real-world observations. In particular, the time-price sub-
stitution effect can be quantified by comparing the perform-
ance of night coach discounted flights with regular daytime
fares.
In the academic field, it is recommended that effort be
devoted to the development of a unified curriculum in air
transportation using the game as the skeleton for demonstra-
tion, exercises, and practice. Finally, some of the exten-
sions mentioned in the previous Chapter should be implemented,
in particular gate time modeling, in order to eliminate the
tendency of participants to "squeeze" the minimum gate time.
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APPENDIX A
OVERVIEW OF AIR TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS
This appendix contains an overview of basic economic con-
cepts as they apply to air transportation. It is included
here as an introductory reference for readers not familiar
with the peculiarities of air transportation, particularly as
they affect the design of the game. First, the general con-
cept of an economic market is introduced. Next, the principal
characteristics of the air transportation market are dis-
cussed.
In the most general terms, an economic market is composed
of two elements: the demand (for goods or services) and the
supply (of goods or services). For simplicity, both goods and
services are called by the single name "product" (air trans-
portation happens to be a service). These products are
"sold", i.e., the supplier transfers them to the "customer" in
exchange for a consideration. The monetary value of this con-
sideration (usually, but not always, cash) is called the
"price" of the product sold. The total amount of a product
that buyers are able and willing to purchase is called the
"demand" for that product. The total amount of that product
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that producers are able and willing to sell is called the
"supply" of that product.
The amount of the product actually sold is equal to the
lowest of the two quantities, supoly or demand, including the
case ("microeconomic equilibrium") where both are equal. If
there is more than one producer of a single product, the mar-
ket is "competitive". In addition to determining how many
units of the product are sold, we want also to know how many
were purchased from each producer. This is called "market
share" (of that producer), and the process that leads to the
determination of market share is the "demand allocation".
In order to simulate a market, the demand must be deter-
mined as a function of all the variables deemed significant,
including, but not limited to, price. The supply must also be
determined based on some variables, including, but not lim-
ited, to, price and costs of production. Supply and demand
may very well be interdependent. Finally, the demand and sup-
ply must be matched in some fashion to determine the quantity
of product actually sold.
In the case of the passenger air transportation industry,
the product (actually, service) sold is a seat in an aircraft
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that departs from an "origin" airport, and arrives to a "des-
tination" airport. If the seat is indeed a seat in a single
aircraft, the service is called a "direct flight" (in spite of
possible intermediate landings!), whereas, if the passenger is
required to change aircraft, the service is called a "connect-
ing flight".
From this definition, it can be seen that the air trans-
portation industry produces an enormous number of different
products: a Boston-San Francisco seat is not considered the
same product as a Boston-Los Angeles seat. There are other
characteristics of this service that may or may not be consid-
ered as differentiating one product from another: type of air-
craft, time of day of deparure, number of intermediate stops
or number of plane changes, etc. Whether a first-class seat
is a different product than a coach seat, or just a "deluxe
version" of the same product is debatable. The difference
between being different products or grades of the same product
is crucial in determining the mechanics of the competition
between these products, or whether they cater to the same
group of buyers or to separate groups of buyers.
The structure of the demand for air transportation dif-
fers from the structure of the supply. An individual desires
205
air transportation (and is willing to pay the price and the
time that it costs him) because, being in a certain place, he
desires to be in a different place at a certain time. Thus,
the demand is basically region-to-region (or city-to-city).
The area around an airport in which air travel using that air-
port originates (or terminates) is the airport's "catch
basin".
The passenger will use surface transportation to the most
convenient airport, and will fly to another airport in his
destination area. In the process, he may transit through dif-
ferent intermediate airports which are related to the struc-
ture of the supply of air transportation (i.e. connections,
intermediate stops), rather than to his transportation needs
("natural" demand). Sometimes, the flow of passengrs through
these intermediate airports is viewed as an "induced" demand
between them. An example would be the traffic between a small
municipal airport and a large hub airport via a commuter or
"feeder" carrier: most of the traffic is not between the
small city and the large city, but rather connects out at the
large airport to other cities, and thus belongs to other
city-pair markets. This demand (between the small airport and
the hub airport) does not correspond to an original travel
need of the consumers, but is induced by the structure of the
supply ("network-induced" demand).
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The total supply, i.e. the network of flights offered, is
of course airport-to-airport. If air transportation consisted
exclusively of non-stop direct flights, and all connections
were prohibited, then there would be a one-to-one correspond-
ence between the supply of flights between two airports, and
the demand for seats between the two airport's catch basins.
The ratio of seats offered to seats purchased would be the
load factor for that market, and the maximum daily capacity in
that market would be simply the total number of seats offered
per day.
Unfortunately for the analyst, but fortunately for the
air traveller, the real world consists also of multi-stop
flights and connecting flights. Thus, the passengers filling
up a leg (or segment) of a flight between two airports include
not only passengers from the catch basins of those two air-
ports, but also passengers from the other airports in the
flight, and even from airports of other flights (connections).
Thus, the one-to-one relation between the seqment's two air-
ports, and the source of the passengers flying that segment is
lost.
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To further complicate matters, an airport's catch basin
depends on the structure of the air transportation under con-
sideration. Long markets (i.e. transportation between cities
that are at a considerable distance - also called "long-haul")
will have a larger catch basin for a given airport than small
("short-haul") local markets, due to the competition of other
modes of transportation. The size of the catch basin depends
also on the level of detail of the analysis being performed:
if both trunk and feeder carriers are considered simulta-
nously, then the "small" catch basins must be used. If only
the long-haul lines are considered, then the effective catch
basin for the hub airports must be enlarged to include the
"catch" brought in by the feeder carriers.
This same problem appears in another context when analyz-
ing partial (e.g. regional) markets. If, for example, the New
England region is being considered, the demand for Hyannis-
Boston transportation must also include the demand for Hyan-
nis-Los Angeles, Hyannis-Chicago, Hyannis-Denver seats. Since
Los Angeles, Chicago, and Denver are outside the region being
considered, the natural demand for travel from Hyannis to
those points must be added to the natural demand for travel
between Hyannis and the "gateway" airport, Boston (assuming
all those passengers connect out of the region at Boston).
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This is the "boundary" effect, and is similar to the network-
induced demand mentioned above.
On the supply side, another problem occurs due to the
fact that the product, (seats from one airport to another), is
supplied in fixed-sized "batches" called "aircraft depar-
tures". A departure is the movement of an aircraft from an
airport to another carrying revenue-paying passengers. This
aircraft carries a certain number of seats, whether occupied
or not. This leads to the concept of "load factor", the ratio
of occupied seats to total seats. Since, as mentioned before,
those seats may be occupied by passengers flying different
origin-destination combinations, the net capacity offered in a
single city-pair is not uniquely determined by the size of the
aircraft and frequency of flights, but may depends on the
traffic in other, interacting, markets that share the same
flights.
The cost of producing the product depends on the load
factor that is actually achieved. If the flight costs a thou-
sand dollars, and there is only one passenger flying, the cost
to the producer of that product is a thousand dollars per pas-
senger. If, however, ten passengers are occupying seats, the
cost of production is $100 per passenger. In practice, (and
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we will follow this practice in this work), production costs
are calculated per aircraft departure, not per seat sold.
A final source of confusion occurs when demand, and sup-
ply, are aggregated over a period of time. If there is a
daily (or weekly, or monthly) variation of demand, while the
maximum capacity is fixed, the various mean values obtained by
averaging the demand may be lower than if the mean demand is
used. This is particularly important when high load factors
are present: the mean load of a 150 passenger day and a 75
passenger day is 100 passengers per day only if the aircraft's
capacity is 150 seats or more. If the aircraft's capacity is,
say, 105 seats, the mean load is 90 passengers, not 100.
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF TIME-OF-DAY VARIATION OF DEMAND
From a purely theoretical standpoint, the variation of
demand for air travel in a given market, as a function of the
time of day is determined by the convenience (or utility) of
the consumer. This convenience depends on the type of con-
sumer considered:
a) A non-business (e.g. pleasure) traveler generally
prefers to travel during the natural active part
of the day (i.e. not by night). Thus, in theory,
his relative demand function is uniform from,
say, 7:00 AM to, say 8:00 P.M.
b) A business traveler generally gears his travel to
the beginning and end of the business day, i.e.
8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M. Thus, his relative
demand function is bimodal, with peaks around the
beginning and the end of the business day.
The question arises, of course, of whether the departure
or the arrival time is the determining factor, or a combina-
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tion thereoff. We will take here the approach suggested by
Eriksen (Reference 12) that the desirability of travel at time
t is the product of the desirability of departing at time t,
by the desirability of arriving at t+dt, where dt is the dif-
ference between the (local) departure time and the (local)
arrival time. Therefore:
D(t;dt) = d(t) d(t+dt) (B.1)
where -the function d is the same, evaluated at the depar-
ture time or at the arrival time. The difference dt depends
thus on both the flight time and the difference between the
departure and arrival time zones.
Eriksen then uses data for the Eastern Airlines Boston to
New York Shuttle service (published by the Port of New York
and New Jersey Authority), to derive d(t). This data (Figure
Bl) is really D(t;l), since the flight time is very approxi-
mately one hour (with no time zone differential). The princi-
pal approximation made in Reference 12 is:
d(t) = D(t;l) (B.2)
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Figure Bl.- Observed time-of-day variation of demand for
Eastern Airlines' Boston-New York shuttle service
From this, Eriksen derives D(t;dt) for various dt's.
There is no further justification of this approximation than
the fact that it produces very reasonable results. To verify
this assumption, we have undertaken to derive the d(t) from
the same data and equation B.l. This process is similar to
the mathematical deconvolution process, which is in itself
analogous to differentiation. A problem often found when dif-
ferentiating empirical data is that the noise has usually a
higher frequency than the desired data. Since differentiation
enhances the high frequencies, this process degrades the
data's signal to noise ratio. This is particularly true of
sampled data such as this. The pseudo-deconvolution process
(inverse of B.1) can be expressed as:
D(l;1)= d(l) d(2)
D(2;l)= d(2) d(3)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . (B.3)
D(23;1)= d(23) d(24)
D(24;l)=d(1) d(24)
This system can be linearized by taking logarithms:
LD(t;l)= M Ld(t) (B.4)
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where 1 is the matrix:
1 0
1 1 ... 0
0 0 0 . . .1 1
0 0 . . . 0 1
(B.5)
thus, we can solve for d(t) by inverting M:
-1
Ld(t)= M LD(t; 1) (B.6)
Actually, the data is given in half-hour intervals, so
that the matrix M is
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1 0 1 0 . . . . 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 . . . . 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 . . . . 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . (B.7)
0 0 0 0 .1 0 1
1 0 0 0 .0 1 0
0 1 0 0 ... . 0 1
Unfortunately, this matrix is, in the 48x48 case, singu-
lar. However, only minor erors are introduced by interchang-
ing two points, for example d(2:00 A.M.) and d(2:30 A.M.),
since both desirabilities, and their neighbors are presumably,
extremely small. With this trick, the matrix can be inverted
(and is well-behaved), to yield d(t).
As predicted, the resulting d(t) is extremely noisy, the
frequency of the noise being, not surprisingly, one-half hour
(the sample period). Figure B2 shows the deconvoluted data,
while figure B3 shows a 64-point Fourier Transform (FFT) of
the data, with the peak harmonic (No. 15) being at the half-
hour frequency.
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Several means of filtering d(t) can be found. A zero-
phase filter is desirable, or else the filtered data would be
shifted in time. The simplest scheme is to truncate the
real-coefficient Fourier series at the 14-th harmonic and re-
transform the data back to the time domain. This was done,
and the results are shown in Figure B4. As it can be seen,
further reduction in the number of harmonics used to recon-
struct the data smooths both the d(t) and the D(t;l) obtained
from it. Indeed, D(t;l) seems to converge towards the sum of
a 6 AM-to-8 PM uniform plus two peaks distribution theoretized
at the beginning of this Appendix.
The ten-harmonic version was selected for initial use in
the simulation. Figure B5 shows how the filtered data com-
pares with Eriksen's approximation for various values of dt.
As it can be seen, the agreement is excellent, confirming the
soundness of Eriksen's approximation.
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APPENDIX C
LOAD FACTOR TAIL-OFF
We will model the daily variaton of demand by means of a
modified Gaussian distribution. This modified, or
y -truncated Gaussian, is the result of truncating a Normal
distribution a distance y from the center, so that only posi-
tive values of the variable are considered. This truncation
requires a renormalization of the usual expression (to insure
that the area under the curve is still unity, see Figure Cl).
If f(x), F(x) are the Normal distribution's density and proba-
bility functions respectively, then the expression for the
probability density of the p-truncated Gaussian is
f (x- p )/F( p ) .
Note (Figure Cl) that the centroid ("expected value") of
the new distribution is not at y any more, but at a slightly
larger value m.
The "ideal" or theoretical average load factor, for an
aircraft capacity c is m/c. The actual average load factor is
the expectation of the traffic actually carried (the lowest of
x or c) divided by c:
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- L 1f
a = E(-) = -
c c\
0
I
min(x,c-y ) f(x) dxl
F~y )
For computational convenience, this can be expressed as:
- 1
a =
c F( I)
1
F ( yI)
c-yi
x f(x) dx +
x f(x) dx
J (c- p) f(x) dx
c-y
+ (1 - F(c- )) (C.2)
where the values of s and c have been normalized (by
dividing them by the standard deviation, o ). In this case, we
have assume that yA = 2 a .
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APPENDIX D
DATA BASE ELEMENTS AND FORMATS
Included for reference are the record formats of the dif-
ferent data bases used in the simulation. These formats,
along with the model descriptions included in the main text,
constitute a complete specification of the simulation from
which computer code may be generated.
There are three kinds of files: a Universe file, a Par-
ticipant file (one for each participant), and a Simulation
file. The Universe file contains data that is reasonably con-
stant during the entire simulation. The Participant file con-
tains both the participants' decisions for the next simulation
period, and the results from the previous period (pertaining
to that participant) that are required for the next simulation
period. The Simulation file contains data unique to a single
simulation period. The Universe and Simulation files are
under control of the simulation manager, while each partici-
pant carrier is responsible for maintaining and updating his
respective Participant file. Access to all these files is by
means of three conversational data base management programs,
one for each kind of file. Each file consists of a variable
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number of different kind of records. The sequence order of
these records is essential, and must be preserved. Each
record contains a number of data items. The Participant's
file (Figure Dl) consists of the following types of records:
-A heading record, containing:
The user i.d. (two characters).
The file i.d. (8 characters).
The date and time it was last saved.
The file's processing status (8 bits).
The name, and save date/time, of the Universe file used
to process the file.
The name of the last period of simulation.
The date/time of the last simulation using it.
The participant's current cash on hand, accumulated
Investment Tax Credit, deferred taxes, and fare for-
mula coefficients.
-A flight record for each flight offered by the partici-
pant, consisting of:
The flight number.
The type of aircraft used.
The aircraft capacity (seats).
The revenue produced by the flight during the last sim-
ulation period.
The origin airport of the first flight segment.
-A segment record, immediately following the flight
record, for each segment in a flight (minimum of 1).
These records contain:
The destination airport's i.d.
The segment departure time.
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Figure D.l - Participant file data structure.
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The segment's block time, flight length, and direct
costs.
The segment load (av. no. of passengers carried daily)
during the last simulation period.
-An "Origin record", consisting simply of the name of an
airport (origin airport). Following this record,
there are a number of "destination" records containing
data relative to the city-pair formed by the origin
airport, and the destination airport. Each destina-
tion record contains:
The name of the destination airport.
The discrete fare charged by the participant in that
city pair.
-Following each destination record, there may be one or
more "online connection records", one for each online
connection that the participant wishes to advertise.
Each online connection record contains:
The i.d. of the connecting airport.
The numbers of the two flights making up the connec-
tion.
The connection's effective departure and arrival times.
The proportion of the total revenue that is to be allo-
cated to the first flight.
-Similarly, there may be one or more "interline connec-
tion records". These records are different from the
on-line ones because no preprocessing of connection
data (e.g. to check the validity of the connection)
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can be done by the participant file processor. Each
interline connection record consists of:
The i.d.'s of the two carriers offering the two flights
that make up the connection.
The two flight numbers.
The i.d. of the connecting airport.
-Fleet records, one for each "batch" of aircraft owned or
leased by the participant, made up of:
The type of aircraft making up the batch.
Their time in service (or time remaining in the lease).
The number of aircraft making up the batch.
The original cost per'aircraft, (or lease payments, for
a lease).
The book value, life, and residual values for the lin-
ear and accelerated depreciation.
-Financial transaction records, one for each financial
transaction active for the participant, including:
A 50-character verbal description of the type of trans-
action.
The remaining active time of the transaction.
The periodic cash flow (e.g. interest).
The final cash flow at the end of the life of the
transaction (e.g. debt repayment).
The Universe file (Figure D2), similarly, consists of the
following records:
-A heading record, containing:
The file's i.d.
The date and time it was last modified.
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4
-A "station record" for each airport used in the simula-
tion, consisting of:
The station's standard three-letter i.d.
The full name of the city served.
The i.d. of the region served by that airport.
The latitude, longitude and time zone.
The minimum connecting time at that airport.
The average air and ground maneuvering time for an
operation at that airport.
The fees/cost per operation (a basic amount plus an
amount per seat).
The aircraft/runway size restriction code.
-A "participant record" for each participant authorized
to use the simulation, consisting of:
The participant's two-letter i.d.
The participant's full name.
The minimum ground time between flight stops, and the
minimum ground time between flights.
The costs per asm, rpm, enplanement, and $ of revenue
for the participant.
-A "market record" for each market (region-pair) to be
included in the simulation, made up of:
The names of the two regions making up the market.
For each of four seasons, the nominal demand, the nomi-
nal fare and level of service corresponding to that
demand, and the fare and level of service elastici-
ties of demand.
-An "aircraft record" for each aircraft type,including:
The aircraft type standard three-letter i.d.
The aircraft's capacity (seats), range and average
cruising airpseed.
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The aircraft's direct operation cost per hour, cost per
takeoff/landing, and cost per day of availability.
Finally, for the simulation file (Fiqure D3), we have the
following:
-A header record, containing:
The file's name and date/time of last update.
The Implicit Price Deflator.
The short term bank deposit interest rate.
The global demand multiplier.
The allocation process elasticities, multiplier and
deadband.
The season to be simulated.
The name to be given to the period.
The time penalty to be added to connecting flights
above their own trip time.
-A "participant record" for specific data to be used for
each participant in this period, consisting of:
The participant's i.d.
The subsidy payments for that participant for this
period of simulation.
-A "transaction record" for each new financial transac-
tion that is to be added to a participant's active
transaction list during the next simulation period,
made up of:
The i.d. of the participant.
The verbal description of the transaction.
The active life (number of periods).
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Fiqure D.3 - Simulation file data structure.
The initial, periodic, and final cash flows implied by
the transaction.
-An "equipment record" for each equipment transaction
(purchase, sale or lease) that is to take place at the
end of the next simulation period. Each record is made
up of:
The i.d. of the participant involved.
The type of aircraft.
The time in service of the aircraft being sold, the
length of the lease, or zero (purchase).
The purchase/sale price, or lease payments.
The life and residual values to be applied for the
straight line and Double Declining Balance deprecia-
tions.
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APPENDIX E
CONVERSATIONAL COMMANDS AVAILABLE
As a reference, and to illustrate the level of complexity
involved in the data base management procedure required to run
this simulation, the conversational commands available under
each of the three file management programs are listed, along
with a brief description of their function.
Universe file processing program (UFP) commands and sub-
commands:
ADDA
ADDM
ADDP
ADDS
DELETEA
DELETEM
DELETEP
DELETES
END
HELP
Add aircraft. Adds a new type of aircraft, and
its characteristics.
Add market. Adds a new market (region pair) and
its demand parameters.
Add participant.
Add station. Adds a new airport and its data.
Delete aircraft.
Delete market.
Delete participant.
Delete station (airport).
End. Terminates the conversational session.
Prints out at the terminal information useful to
the user about each command/subcommand available.
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LISTA Lists either all the aircraft types available, or
the parameters of a given aircraft type.
LISTM Lists either all the markets known or the
parameters of a given market.
LISTP Lists either all the participants, or the
parameters of a given participant.
LISTS Lists either all the airports known, or the
parameters of a given airport.
MODIFYA Modifies the parameters of a given aircraft. This
command has the following subcommands:
C/DAY Modify the cost per day of availability.
DOC/H Modify the direct cost per hour.
DOC/O Modify the direct cost per operation.
RANGE Modify the aircraft range.
REST Modify the aircraft's restriction code.
SEATS Modify the aircraft's capacity.
SPEED Modify the aircraft's cruising airspeed.
MODIFYM Modifies the parameters of a given market. This
command has the following subcommands:
FELAST Modify the fare elasticity of demand.
LELAST Modify the level-of-service elasticity.
NDEMAND Modify the nominal total demand.
NFARE Modify the nominal fare.
NLOS Modify the nominal level-of-service.
MODIFYP Modifies the parameters of a given participant.
This command has the following subcommands:
CASM Modify the cost per asm.
CENP Modify the cost per enplanement.
CRPM Modify the cost per rpm.
C/REV Modify the cost per $ of revenue.
INTERT Modify the minimum interflight time.
NAME Change the participant's full name.
STOPT Modify the minimum ground time.
MODIFYS Modifies the parameters of a given airport
(station). This command has the following subcommands:
BASICC Modify the basic operation cost.
BASICT Modify the around/air maneuvering time.
CITYN Change the full name of the city served.
CONNT Modify the minimum connecting time.
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COST/S Modify the landing fee per seat.
LAT,LON Modify the latitude, longitude.
MARKETA Change the i.d. of the market area served.
RESTC Change the aircraft/airport restriction code.
TIMEZ Change the time zone.
NOVERB Request short form of terminal messages.
READ Read data from existing file into the processor.
SAVE Write current data into a file.
VERB Request long form of terminal messages.
Participant file processing program (PFP) commands and
subcommands:
ACCD Add connection (online or interline).
ADDF Add flight. Adds a new flight to schedule.
CHECKS Check station. Checks the aircraft flow in and
out of each airport used; if flow balances, the
no. of aircraft required by type is displayed.
COPYF Copy flight. Copies one flight into a new one,
at a different departure time.
DELETEC Delete connection.
DELETEF Delete flight.
INTERFT List the minimum interflight time parameter.
LISTA List the participant's active financial
transactions.
LISTB List the cash balance and other data.
LISTC List connections.
LISTE List the aircraft available to the participant.
LISTF List either all the flight numbers, or the data
for a given flight.
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LISTS List the aircraft flow through a station.
LISTT List the tariffs available between two cities
(airports).
MODIFYF Modify the parameters of a given flight. This
command has the following subcommands:
EQUIP Change the type of aircraft used.
ITIN Modify the flight itinerary.
SCHED Modify the flight schedule.
SHIFTD Shift the entire schedule in time.
NAME Change the file name.
NOVERB Request short terminal messages.
READ Read data from existing file into processor.
REDOF Re-compute a flight's parameters.
SAVE Store the current data into a file.
STOPT List the minimum ground time parameter.
TARIFFC List/change the fare formula coefficients.
USER Change the user to whom the file belongs.
VERB Request long terminal messages.
The data validity checks that the participant file proc-
essor makes on the input data are:
a) Spelling of abbreviations (airport names, aircraft
types).
b) Airport - aircraft compatibility (runway length).
c) Stage length - aircraft range compatibility.
d) Minimum ground time between arrival and departure
of the same flight.
e) Validity of interline connections, with regards to
both itinerary and schedule (including minimum
connecting time at the connecting airport).
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The processor performs the following operations on the
input data, either in preparation for the simulation step, as
an aid to the user, or both:
a) Computation of the block times for each flight
segment.
b) Computation of the direct costs (see Section 3.2.1)
for each segment.
c) Computation and display of the earliest time at
which an aircraft is available after a flight.
d) Preparation of a list of flight initiations and
terminations for each airport at which flights
initiate and terminate.
e) Check of the aircraft flow at these airports.
f) Computation of the number of aircraft required to
fly a (balanced) network, by aircraft type.
g) Computation and display of the Standard, carrier
formula (see Section 3.1) and carrier discretionary
fares for each market.
h) Display (only) of the carrier's financial and
equipment data.
Simulation file processing program (SFP) commands and
subcommands:
ADDE Add an equipment transaction.
ADDF Add a financial transaction.
ALLOCM Modify the allocation multiplier.
CONCO Modify the connection correction parameter.
DELETEA Delete an equipment transaction.
DELETEE Delete a financial transacton.
DELTAA List/modify the allocation deadband param.
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DEMM Modify the global demand multiplier.
IPD Modify the Implicit Price Deflator.
LISTB List a participant's balance and other data.
LISTE List the equipment transactions entered.
LISTF List the financial transactions entered.
LISTS List a summary of simulation parameters.
NAME Change the name of the period simulated.
READ Read data from existing file into processor.
SAVE Save current data into a file.
SEASON Change the season for next simulation.
SHORTR Modify the short-term deposit interest rate.
SUBSIDY List/modify the subsidy paid to each
participant.
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